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University of the Punjab, Lahore

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN BALOCHISTAN

Ishtiaq Ahmed Chaudhry
Naheed Anjum Chishti

ABSTRACT

Pakistani society is undergoing a significant social change under the impact of urbanization, education and the national policy towards socio-economic development. As a consequence the province of Balochistan is being affected by such a change as more conscious efforts are directed towards the women population. An effort is being made to change the society from a traditional tribal that which can confront the challenges of the new era. However, the pace of change in the Baloch society at large and particularly in family patterns has been slower than in other provinces. This is particularly pertaining to the role and status of women in the community and in the family. Thus, the persisting perception of women's role in society, and their regulation to the domestic domain, demising their role in the public domain, is an impertinent toward their integration in the national development programs. Activities undertaken by women in Pakistan and particularly in Balochistan are given inadequate recognition and are not reflected in the mainstream of national economy. The present study is an attempt to compile available data to provide a comprehensive and systemic vision so as to improve the situation of women in the province and enhance their status and role in the family, the community and national development.

Introduction

Women are a major force behind people's participation in a society. Not only do they comprise the majority of those excluded from participation but play a leading role in the emergence of groups organizations and movements world wide. At the same time are becoming increasingly active in their communities, government and the international arena. In the first place, there can be no true

democracy, no proper people's participation in governance and development without the equal participation of women in all spheres of life and levels of decision making. Second, the goals of development cannot be attained without women's full participation not only in the development process, but also in shaping its goals. Third, women's participation to bring changes through new priorities and perspectives to the political process and the organization of society. In focusing attention on the most neglected portion of humanity, women and girls participation can make the society more responsive to the needs of all people. Furthermore, bringing new insights and contributions to all issues could enrich and shift the focus and content of discourse in politics and society to include a wider range of views. Elevating the status of women and girl children, will improve the economic and social development of the province of Balochistan. In changing the unequal balance of decision-making power and control on the relation of men and women in the house hold, in the work place, in communities in government and in the international arena will lead to women's empowerment.

Participation has two dimensions - quantitative and qualitative. The tendency in the part has been to focus mainly on the quantitative aspects of people's participation and to measure it principally in terms of numbers of people, irrespective of the quality of their participation or their involvement in decision-making process. For instance, development agencies often considered people's participation mainly in terms of the member involved in development programmes and projects. In this way, women's participation was measured by how many women were affected by a project even if they were simply passive recipients of development aid, without any voice in the design, implementation or monitoring and evaluation of the project. Similarly in workers political and social change organizations and movement, women often make up the majority of the ranks and file but comprise a minority of the leadership and decision-makers. Notwithstanding, there exists a relationship between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of participation. The larger the number of participants, the more possibilities exists to make a difference. It generally takes a critical mass of women to effect change. Other factors however, such as Universal gender discrimination, present obstacle, not only to the number of women participants but also to their access to leadership and decision-making.¹

The focus in changing from the quantitative to the qualitative aspects and participation is conceptualized in broader terms. According to the Human Development report 1993, prepared by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), participation means that people are closely involved in the economic, social cultural and political processes, that affect their lives. People may in some cases, have complete and direct control over these processes - in other case, the control may be partial or indirect. The important thing is that people have constant access to decision making and power. Participation in this sense is an essential element of human development.²

The decision making system consist of the cluster of structures and processes which receives demand and support inputs as relayed through the linkage - communication system and convert them into policy outputs which create, promote, and allocate values, for all components and for the system as a whole. Inter-relationship and interaction is again characteristic. Structures and processes within the decision-making system are interrelated and interact with the other components, of the System. For democracy, popular participation is the selection of key decision makers and opportunities for individual, from all sectors and strata of society to attain political office. It becomes essential that, such popular participation and opportunity becomes possible to the extent that an autonomous linkage - communication system provides for effective and equitable political recruitment for both specialist and generalist types. The participation can only be maximized by means of citizen involvement in some kind of organized activity, such as via political parties and interest groups, rather than directly in the decision making processes - political parties play a vital role in the political participation process. Effective political parties are the major institutions, which contribute to stability and effectiveness, and provide for public influence, by mobilizing, stabilizing and structuring mass participation.³ Elections are the major means whereby the general public can influence and even control the decision making process. At election time, parties can provide the public with meaningful choice as to who shall be in the decision making processes and as to what general kind of programme or policy direction the government should pursue. While dealing with the conditions and placement of women in Balochistan the above presumptions would be taken into consideration.

Women's Status: An Overview

Although women of Balochistan can play a vital role in the political process and contribute towards the developmental process in an appropriate manner, it is equally accurate to say that equal participation of men and women in decision making is a prerequisite for effective and genuine democracy. But unfortunately in Balochistan major decisions that affect the lives of the women in the form of laws and policies are solely decided by male leaders with virtually no participation by women. There are two questions that are raised in our minds, regarding the Baloch women: (a) why so many of the laws are discriminatory? and (b) why most policies marginalize women?

It is generally presumed that as a member of a family, class or profession women's concerns and opinions are the same as other members and can be articulated equally well by male representatives. A number of studies have proved that to be untrue. When choices have to be made within limited resources, women's concerns and priorities can be considerably different from those of the male members of the society. In the political arena, the Balochi women have minimal participation and representation, which is spread to all aspects of the political activity. In the National and Provincial elections of 2002, there were 25 million registered female voters against more than 30 million male. One of the reasons is the specific hurdles that women face in the exercise of their franchise.

The socio-cultural norms of Pakistani society promote female segregation and there is minimal acceptability of the validity of even marginal political participation of women. It is fairly common for the political parties, particularly in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), not to let their women supporters come and vote. In various elections held in Pakistan, the Jirga decisions in the newly enfranchised areas of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) resulted in a massive denial of franchise to the female electorate. Though official efforts were made to convince women to vote regardless of the threats, the official agencies were not willing to take action against the offenders, who were violating the provisions of the law, which clearly gave the right of vote to the women voters.

The participation of women can be gauged from their numbers at the common membership level, their representation in decision making bodies of the political parties and the number of tickets given to them in general elections. According to the current

statistics, there are currently three women out of a total membership of 21 in the central executive committee of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and five out of 47 in the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) (N). In their allocation of tickets to women in the 1997 elections the PPP and its coalition partner PML (J) fielded nine women out of a total of 177. At the level of representation, in the previous National Assembly women comprised less than 2 % of the total membership of the house (from out of 217) 2.4 % in the Senate (two out of 83), and 1.5 % in the Muslim membership of the Provincial assemblies (7 out of 460). In the current National Assembly women comprise about 2.7 % of the total membership (six out of 217) and about 0.21 % of the total membership of the Provincial Assemblies (1 out of 483), Senate membership remaining the same. Women have no representation in the minority membership of the National Assembly, which consist of 10 seats, nor in the minority membership of the Provincial assemblies, which consists of 23 seats. This minimal representation of women at all levels reflects the inadequacy of the commitment of political parties and the effectiveness of any attempts to mainstream women in the political arena. This is primarily cultural and social basis that pervade society, actively discourage women's participation. Special provisions for women's seats have existed since 1935, i.e., even during the colonial period. Seats were reserved in 1954 and all the subsequent elections and there were requirements in the 1956, 1962 and 1973 constitutions for these reserved seats till the provision stood layered after 1988 elections. The most recent constitutional provision for women's representation was for about 10 % seats in the National Assembly and 5 % in the Provisional Assemblies.

Profile of Women in Balochistan

A traditional dominated Baloch and Pushtoon family set up prevails throughout the province, which is primarily a male dominant system. This is due to the predominantly male control on means of subsistence, which include both the vital productive resources and monopoly of all jobs concerning trade and service. Whereas the jobs which remain in the purview of women are mainly processing and preparing related to agriculture, fish farming and livestock, e.g., looking after the herd or sorting of fish. By doing such work they equally contribute to the economy of their family, but the control of subsistence and economic earning is in the hands of men. The male household head is the one who has the sole right to allocate or deny the share of family resources to its members. A woman has to ask him for her share even if she has participated equally in the earning

process. A women's role in the family revolves around the daily household work, including care of children and animals, preparing food, cleaning and washing, besides helping in the fields. Her efforts are also invested in other activities e.g. to fetch the basic necessity, water - which is in short supply. There are areas where a woman has to walk for miles with rubber cans of water, twice or sometimes thrice a day. The Balochi women have a dual responsibility in the house and in the field. She provides extensive labour to supplement the family income and maintain the regular household business. Like all other societies, which are primitive in nature, tribal in structure and semi-nomadic, the Baloch, Pushtoon and Brahvis of Balochistan possess same distinctive traditional values and attitudes regarding the role and status of women.

Women's Literacy Rate in Balochistan

Balochistan statistics concerning education of women portray a depressing picture. The pattern of female education levels in Balochistan is similar to other provinces in terms of general trends, i.e., low service levy, inequitable distribution and an elite urban bias, but the situation with regard to services and percentages is much worse, particularly in the rural areas. The society assigns to females certain responsibilities, which the traditionally norms consider to be the same for both literate and illiterate women.

In the province of Balochistan there has been little emphasis on the female education. The data collected from different Census reports, which are conducted after every decade, reflect a gradual and a slow pace increase of the literacy among women. The situation of education in Balochistan is worse as the overall literacy rate in Balochistan of 10.3 per cent (1981 Census) is considerably lower than the overall national rate. The literacy rate of females in Balochistan is 4.3 per cent. This is easily explained by the generally low priority for education in the province for both males and females. Literate women normally belong to the urban areas. The rural female's literacy rate is 1.7 per cent. Another noteworthy fact is that the literacy rate among urban females of Balochistan has dropped by 1 per cent from the 19.2 percent recorded in 1972, to 18.5 percent recorded by the 1981 Census. One possible explanation is that the increased enrollment rate of girls was offset by a faster population growth rate. The literacy rate directly depends on two important factors; easy access to facilities and social motivation. Both of which are concomitant to each other. Facilities generate motivation, and

motivation creates the atmosphere to develop facilities. The combination of these factors is absent from the Balochi scene.

Educational Trends


The social structure and exploitative tribal and political systems impede the creation of conditions in which education facilities could flourish. In 1921, there was only one vernacular Middle School in Balochistan, which was meant to serve the male population. Later on an increase can be observed, with 60 new female schools being established in two years since 1985 bringing the 1987 total to 508.

In a society like Balochistan many more taboos are associated with higher education for females. People do agree that their daughters could go to a primary school at a very early age but after a certain age, which varies from community to community - but is usually pre-adolescence onwards, the restrictions became severe for girls and their movement is restrained to the house. Even if a girl has acquired high school education, with a high performance level and she is eager to learn more, these restraints obstruct her aspirations. Therefore, enrolment at the collect level has been low and even the numbers of institutions are gradually decreasing

At the moment there are two Inter colleges for girls; one in Sibi and the other in Loralai. It is worth mentioning that one Intermediate College in Kalat was closed down due to local pressures. In 1986-87 the female enrolment of Intermediate College was 93, while there is only one Degree College for girls in Quetta, with an enrolment of 1,596 students. Out of about 2 million females residing in Balochistan only 1700 can find a place in a college for higher education - reflecting an alarming low percentage.

| YEARS SCHOOL) | Number of Girls (PRIMARY) |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1984-85 | 454 |
| 1985-86 | 488 |
| 1986-87 | 508 |
| 1987-88 | 515 |
| 1988-90 | 517 |

Directorate of Education Balochistan



Source: Directorate of Education, Government of Balochistan, 1991

Political Participation of Women in Balochistan

In a traditional Balochi Sardari society a women's role is considered marginal and insignificant and she is conditioned into passive obedience, and becomes virtual invisibility in the community affairs. A study was conducted in the mid 1980, Nasirabad, Sibi and Kachi, districts (Predominantly inhabited by Baloch people) by the department of social Welfare, Local Government, University of Balochistan in collaboration with UNESIEF. The findings of the study show that women are denied most of their rights and are subservient to men. The village society is largely polygamous and the women are not allowed to work as according to their own choice - they rather can not even express their opinions freely. The researchers also found that most of the woman consulted their husbands before answering the questions asked to them⁴. The concept and importance of the female basically revolves around families. As there is a Sardair system in this province, thereby the Nawabs and Sardars play vital and dominating role in decision making process and the tribal norms are inculcated within the political culture. Many major left wing parties such as JWP, BNP (M) AND BNP (A) do have organized women wings. Women in these parties are member of central committees;

women's participation in political process displays a broad spectrum of activities engulfing active participation election campaign for the candidates by mobilizing the casting of vote and being polling agents. In most of the above-mentioned activities, under taken by women, the division of duties is dictated by male leadership rather than decided by the women themselves. However, in few areas awareness and education has led to flentulity in attitudes. The party male wing decides that who would contest the election. During the 1999 local councils election few members refused to follow this trend, including a women who is member of central committee BNP (M). Realization of women wing has increased over the years. Now women have been able to get membership in the central committees of the parties. But still the stagnancy of norms leads to reluctance amongst male members in depicting any optimistic attitude towards women issues. The parties still have to follow suit.

Tribal norms and religious pressures are manipulated to serve the interests of men and deprive women of their political rights. All the political parties in Balochistan realize the importance of the registration of votes of the women. Parties actively register female voters in order to add up to their vote banks, particularly in constituencies where the opposition is tough. During the year 1993 the number of female registered voters was 12,66,29, which in 1997 increased to 13,68,797. The NGOs/CBOs played vital role to create political awakening among the women to cast their votes. They highlight the importance of women's vote and help attain ID cards for them which are a requirement for voting. Sometimes, increased pressure from political rival, often lead, to making fake. I.D cards, particularly for females as the *purdah* allows females to cast bogus votes by hiding their identity. Separate polling booths are necessary for women in Balochistan but this facility is available in Quetta only. Female staff in these booths is also confined to Quetta. In other districts combined polling booths are provided and the staff consists of aged male members. The is one of the setbacks which leads to a decline in females casting their votes as the tribal norms restricts the women from going to the polling booths. In most of the tribal areas women don't cast their vote according to their own will. Frequent reports of bogus votes are received from female polling booths and it stands true for the current local council's elections in Balochistan.

However in urban areas women have realized the importance of their vote and have started to cast at their will to same intent. Increasingly, the women play an active role during the elections. Political parties extend their cooperation to women in terms of transport for convincing and getting the voters to the polling booths. Women also play an active role as polling agents. However contesting the elections as candidates remains alien to the women, has now been put into practice. During the current local councils elections two women contested elections on general seats of Municipal Corporation, Quetta. One of the females had six male opponents while the other had three male opponents. Increased number of women are now showing interest to contest the elections. During 1992 out of 847 reserve seats no nomination was filed on 315 reserved seats for women and 302 were vacant (16.12 %), revealing a sharp decline in the number of vacant seats despite the increase in the number of seats.

Conclusion

After the creation of Pakistan, women organizations contributed immensely, particularly in the field of social welfare, health and education and we also saw the emergence of women as active politicians. However, such activity was at best directed to motivate from the top and there was no inherent strength for mass movement to assure that women be granted their basic rights and needs and equal opportunities in life. This situation has radically changed in the last few years. The 1973 constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan guarantees equal rights and opportunities to all citizens and in Article 25,⁵ it has been laid down that all citizens are equal before Law and are entitled to equal protection. In the same article, it has been further promised that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex. The Article confirms that nothing shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the protection of women and children. In Article 34, it has been made imperative on the state to take steps to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life. In Article 51, it has been laid down that the National Assembly should consist of two hundred members to be directly elected on a free vote and 10 seats, in addition to the number of seats on which women are elected direct, shall be reserved for women and allocated to the provinces in accordance with the constitution and the law likewise; Article 228, guarantees the appointment of at least one female member to the Islamic ideology council.

Despite such bright precedents and a persistent stress on the principle of equality in international human Rights documents and the Constitutions, discrimination against women still exists, which is in violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity. The convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) recognizes discriminations against women, and in order to combat them it provides through its Articles 3 that the States shall ensure participation in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men". Further Article 7 stresses that "State parties shall take all appropriate measures, to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country, and in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men."⁶

It is desired that the Women should:

- (a) Vote in all elections and public referendum, and in all publicly elected bodies;
- (b) Participate in the formation of government policy and the implementation thereof, and to hold public office and perform all levels of government. And as article 8 lays down that "State parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their government at the international level and to participate on the work of international organizations" The representation of women in the Pakistan's parliament is the lowest in South -east Asian region. According to data compiled by the Colombo - based International Centre for Ethnic Studies, the highest representation of women in parliament is in Bangladesh with 11.2 percent, followed by Malaysia 7.8.; India 7.2 (in the last parliament, Sri Lanka 4.8, Singapore 3.4 percent, with Pakistan languishing at the bottom of the Ladder.

In order to keep pace with the international community and to make Pakistan a truly democratic country, the participation of women in politics will have to be ensured, the sooner it is done, the better.

NOTES

¹United Nations. (1991) *The Women's World 1970-90 : Trends and Statistics*. New York: United Nations publications, p.6.

²Mary, R.B.(1973) *women as a Force in History*; New York: Collier Books, p.10.

³Huntington, Samuel P. (1988) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New York Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 397-433.

⁴ Pehnsen, Robert N (1977) *The Social Organization of the Baloch*; Karachi: Indus publication. ,P. 26.

⁵The Government of Pakistan. (1973) *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*; Government of Pakistan Publication. Articles 25, 34, 35, 51, 228.

⁶ United Nations. (1992) *The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of discrimination against women*. Geneva: Articles 3,7,3.

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LEARNING ACHIEVEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: SELECTED REGIONS OF PAKISTAN

Habib Khan & Daud Shah

Abstract

This study has assessed learning achievement of students at primary level and has identified the major factors associated with students' performance at this level. Sample for this study consists of seven districts (one from each province/region). Four schools (two boys and two girls) were selected from each of the sample districts. From each selected school, 20 students of class-V were randomly picked for testing. In all 504 children were selected. In this study, the achievements tests in Mathematics, Science and Urdu that were developed for the first study (Measuring Learning Achievement at Primary Level in Pakistan) were used. All 504 students had qualified grade IV and were currently studying in grade V. They can be useful in developing an insight into some of the crucial factors affecting learning in the government schools of Pakistan.

Introduction

NEMIS is the National Educational Management Information Services that is responsible for monitoring several aspects of EFA and basic education in Pakistan. One of the objectives of NEMIS includes developing and maintaining quantitative as well as qualitative databases on basic education. The quantitative aspect of NEMIS is quite strong as it is based on a time series data that database has been established for the past eight years. Quantitative database comprises data on enrollments, teachers and facilities in schools, whereas qualitative aspect of NEMIS has been tackled for last two years. In the first attempt in 1999, a national achievement study was conducted based on a nation wide representative sample. A standardized test in Mathematics, Science, and the national language Urdu was given to about 2800 grade V children all over the country. The findings were incorporated in a qualitative database designed for this purpose and the findings were published. In the next stage an attempt was made to examine relationship between

independent variables and the dependent variable or the student achievement. Under the NEMIS Project a research study named "A Study on comparing school performance to understand which schools are doing better by assessing and comparing quality of education" was conducted by the Academy. The study has tried to identify those factors that affect the student's achievement in the public primary schools at the national level.

Rationale

Education plays a key role in the socio-economic development of a country. Various studies conducted by the World Bank reveal that returns to primary education are the highest among all the educational levels. Primary and elementary education can help in alleviating poverty by increasing income, improving health and nutrition and reducing fertility. Bacchus examined the quality of education that is so poor that it is not effective to contribute to the national growth of many developing countries. There are many factors responsible for this situation including a marked decline in the resources made available for education. The World Bank too noted that Primary school children in the low income countries learn less than what their national curricula expect and also learn very little in comparison to their counterparts in richer countries. They perform especially poorly when tasks require applying knowledge to new problems. Not only access to school is important but also the student's learning is very crucial. To address the concern of quality of education, various national educational policies have emphasized the importance of quality of education.

Quality of education at the primary level is dependent upon many factors including teacher's qualifications (both formal and professional), availability of teaching learning materials and physical facilities in the schools, as well as the socio-economic background of the students. Because of the low quality of education particularly at the primary level, many parents feel that educating children in public primary schools is not worthwhile; therefore, the parents who can afford prefer to send their children to private schools for better quality of education. If the quality of education is improved, the enrolment would increase and it would give a greater return on investment.

Various inputs are required for educating primary school age children; therefore, quality of outcomes is dependent on these inputs. The student's achievement assessment can be used as an instrument through which valuable information can be obtained to assess the quality of education at the primary level. The information can help to rationalize inputs on quality especially with regard to the availability of physical facilities in schools, learning materials, and relevance of teacher's training and revision of curricula. This would also provide feedback information to the policy makers and planners about the performance of the primary education system. Like most developing countries, Pakistan is also confronted with the dual challenges of quantitative expansion and qualitative improvement. Quality education implies meaningful learning and better learning is the result of effective schooling. It also implies the effective and efficient use of resources because the budgetary figures and allocation to education suggest that the education system suffers a shortfall between optimum resources and the reality of budgets.

The purpose of this study is to identify those factors, which are considered effective in the teaching and learning process. These factors include the availability of physical facilities in schools, learning materials, teachers' academic and professional qualifications, teaching experiences, as well as the socio-economic background of the students. This study also tried to establish the relationship of these factors on students' achievement in order to identify major factors affecting the students' performance at the primary level.

Objectives of the Study

The study was conducted to measure the learning achievement of students at primary level and to identify major factors affecting the quality of education at the primary level. The main objectives of this study are as follows:

- i. Assess students' learning achievement in Science, Mathematics, and Language (Urdu) of grade -IV at primary level in the context of curriculum and compare students' performance by gender and region;
- ii. Examine the impact of teaching on students' performance by teacher traits i.e. academic and professional qualifications and experience;

- iii. Investigate the impact of physical facilities on students performance; and
- iv. Explore the impact of family background of students on their performance.

Review of Literature

Review of literature indicates that about 19 studies have been conducted on the students learning achievement in Pakistan at the primary level by various organizations. Most of these studies are sponsored by the international donor agencies. Very few studies have tried to identify those factors affecting the quality of education at the primary level. The Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) conducted a number of research studies on the achievement test at the primary level in Pakistan during 1988-89. These studies tried to identify various factors affecting the students' achievement at the primary level. A MSU study (1995) tried to measure the learning achievement at the primary level and to relate some of the factors with the students' achievement. The relevant findings of some of these are reported in the subsequent section. The Harvard study (1992) on "Teacher Certification: Value Added or Money Wasted" reported that the level of primary school teacher's formal education had a positive impact on the achievement of his or her students in Mathematics and Science. The student test score in both fields rose with each additional year the teacher spent in school. Whereas teacher certification did not improve the classroom practices used by teacher and had only a modest influence on the achievement of their students. (Warwick, D.P. and Riemers F., 1992. p. 27-28). Another Harvard study (1989) entitled "Do Differences Between Schools and Between School Administrators in Pakistan Contribute to Differences in Student Achievement?" indicated no reliable relationships between the presence or absence of school facilities and scores on achievement tests (McGinn, N., Warwick, D.P. and Riemers, F., 1989. p. 9). The Harvard research paper (1991) on "Good School and Poor School in Pakistan" identified the good schools as having higher achievers with the following characteristics:

- the school is located in an urban rather than a rural area;
- teachers have a higher level of formal education;
- student achievement increases with every additional year of the teacher's schooling;

- teachers are responsible for one class rather than several; and
- teachers make students translate their presentations for pupils who do not understand the teacher's language. (Warwick, D.P. and Riemers F., 1991. p. 25-26).

A national survey carried out by MSU to identify "Determinants of Primary Students Achievements" (MSU-SAP 1995) reported that the students' score improved with the higher academic qualifications of teachers. The report also identified that the literacy of both parents did have positive impact on their children's score. However, this impact was higher in the case of a literate father where the difference was nine percent points and in case of literate mother the difference was four percent point. The literacy of mother had a greater impact on the boys' achievement as compared to girls. The father literacy did also have a greater impact on the boys' achievements than the girls. The MSU study reported an average percentage score of 46 in Mathematics, 74 in General Knowledge and 69 in Comprehension. This study reported an improvement of 25 percent point during 1989-1995 in mathematics. Students of the Punjab province obtained the highest score in mathematics followed by the students of Balochistan whereas, the students from NWFP were the lowest scorers. In addition, the boys performed better than the girls in Mathematics by scoring three percent points higher. The study did not find any significant difference in the overall performance of the urban and rural students. The Rural students, however, did better in mathematics but the urban students performed better in General Knowledge and comprehension ((MSU-SAP 1995, p. 9,13, Table 2.1 & 3.1). AEPAM (2000) study entitled "Measuring Learning Achievement at Primary Level in Pakistan" reported 58 mean percent score in mathematics, and 72 for both Science and Urdu of grade 5 students (Khan et al., 2000 pp.14). Action Aid Pakistan survey (1999) found average percent score 60 in Mathematic, 67 in Urdu and 71 in the General Knowledge of students of public schools. Action Aid study also indicated better performance of boys over girls in all the subjects (Pakistan, Education for All-the year 2000 Assessment, Pakistan Country Report, 2000 p.44-45). Regarding low level of achievement at the primary level in Pakistan particularly in Mathematics. Shah (1984) reported an average percentage score of 35 in Mathematics of grade-5 students and average percentage score 38 in Science of grade-4 students (1984, pp.211). Rugh et al. (1991) reported the mean percentage score as 21 for Mathematics, 30 for

science and 34 for Urdu (1991 pp.11). Rugh's study indicated a decline in achievement score for mathematics from 35% in 1984 to 21% in 1989.

National Education Policy (1992) stated that the quality aspects of education have been compromised because of rapid expansion of the primary system. This calls for an urgent examination of the measures needed for raising the quality of education in Pakistan. The policy proposed various measures such as training of teachers, provision of primary kit to each school, special federal funds for improvement of the physical facility and the gradual increase in the number of primary teachers. (p. 16-19). National Education Policy (1998-2010) places great emphasis on the quality of education. The policy proposes that a system of continuous evaluation should be adopted at the elementary level to ensure attainment of minimum learning competencies. It also proposes raising the minimum educational qualification of primary teachers from Matric to Intermediate and revising contents and methodology of teacher education curricula (p. 2-3). The policy further proposes the following steps to improve the quality of education:

- To ensure achievement of minimum level of learning up to 90 percent primary education students by the year 2010.
- To meet the basic learning needs of the child in terms of essential learning tools as well as the basic learning contents.
- Teachers' competence shall be improved and the relevance of training programmes for teachers shall be ensured.
- A monitoring system shall be developed to obtain timely and reliable information on enrolment, retention, completion and achievement. The qualitative monitoring of achievement shall also be introduced. (p. 28-29).

Methodology

Academy of Educational Planning and Management conducted a study on "Measuring Learning Achievement at Primary Level in Pakistan" during 1999. Under the said study, 28 districts from all the provinces/regions were selected. The total number of primary schools was 145 (75 boys schools and 70 girls schools) and total numbers of 2794 class-V students (1411 boys and 1383 girls) included in the sample. The achievement tests in Science, Mathematics, and Urdu based on the curriculum and textbooks of

class-IV were administered to 2794 students of class-V at the national level.

The above-mentioned study did not identify the crucial factors affecting the quality of education. Therefore, the current study has been designed to assess the learning achievement of the students at the primary level and to identify the major factors affecting students' performance at this level. For this study, seven districts (one from each province/region) have been chosen. Four schools have been selected from each sample district. From each selected school, twenty students of class-V have been selected. The achievement tests of Mathematics, Science and Urdu developed by the Academy for the earlier study namely "Measuring Learning Achievement at Primary Level in Pakistan" have been used for measuring students' learning achievement. The test consisted of multiple-choice items in Mathematics (33 items), Urdu (35 items) and Science (35 items). The AEPAM data collection team administered the test to 504 students of grade-V. Relevant information had also been collected from 53 (29 male & 24 female) teachers of class-IV & V of selected primary schools and from 26 (15 male & 11 female) head teachers of selected primary schools. The distribution of sample is given below:

| District | Location | | | | | | Total |
|---------------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | Urban | | | Rural | | | |
| | Boys | Girls | Total | Boys | Girls | Total | |
| Islamabad | 20 | 20 | 40 | 20 | 20 | 40 | 80 |
| Lahore | 40 | 20 | 60 | - | - | - | 60 |
| Karachi | 14 | 65 | 79 | - | - | - | 79 |
| Peshawar | 20 | 20 | 40 | 19 | 21 | 40 | 80 |
| Quetta | 20 | 20 | 40 | 20 | 16 | 36 | 76 |
| Khyber Agency | - | - | - | 38 | 22 | 60 | 60 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 18 | 11 | 29 | 20 | 20 | 40 | 69 |
| Total | 132 | 156 | 288 | 117 | 99 | 216 | 504 |

Data Analyses

The data has been subjected to statistical treatment to establish the relationship between the dependent variable (achievement score) and independent variables (availability of physical facilities in school, teacher's qualifications and training, parental education of students, location and gender) using various statistical techniques. In order to draw inference regarding the relationship between dependent and independent variables different

statistical tests of significance such as "t" and "F" at .05 level of significance have been used. The data has been analyzed by using statistical packages such as SPSS.

Results

Every effort has been made to present the results in a comprehensible and simple manner. The students' correctly answered average percentage score alongwith other measures such as frequency distribution, Mode, Median, Standard Deviation, Quartiles and Histogram are reported for each subjects in this section. Inter district/provincial, gender and area wise differences in each subjects are also reported. The results of analysis are reported in this section.

Performance of Students on Mathematics Test

It is observed that the mean percentage score in Mathematics is 48 (48% questions correctly answered). The distribution is positively skewed which indicates that the performance of most of the students is poor. Most of the students' score range from 26% to 50% and the mean percentage score of that group is 39, which is nine points below the overall percentage mean. Only 63 students got the highest score, ranging from 76% to 100%. The detailed results are reported in the following tables.

Table-1
Frequency Distribution of Score

| Score | Mathematics | Mean |
|--------|-------------|------|
| 1-25 | 82 | 16 |
| 26-50 | 210 | 39 |
| 51-75 | 149 | 61 |
| 76-100 | 63 | 85 |
| Total | 504 | 48 |

From table-1 it is observed that 58% of the students have scores ranging from 1% to 50% whereas 42% of the students have scores above 50%. Very few students (about 13%) can be classified as high achievers and their score range from 76% to 100% with mean score of 85%. As it can be seen the performance of the majority of students is quite low in mathematics.

Figure 1




Figure-1 shows that the distribution of the test score is positively skewed, which indicates that the performance of the majority of the students is quite low in the test. About one third of students on average correctly answered upto 30% of the questions. The distribution shows that 82 students on average correctly answered 60% of the questions, which is the highest number of students in distribution obtaining that score. Only 30 students managed to obtain the highest average percentage score of 90. Score of the most of the students fall below mean.

Table-2
Distribution of Test Score

| Statistics | Mathematics |
|--------------------------|-------------|
| Mean | 48 |
| Median | 47 |
| Mode | 45 |
| SD | 22 |
| 1st quartile | 32 |
| 3 rd quartile | 63 |
| Skewness | .176 |

Table-2 indicates that the mean and median scores are 48% and 47% respectively. The modal value of the distribution is 45%. Twenty-five percent of the students have scores below 32% and 75 percent of the students have scores below 63%. The Standard Deviation is 22%, which indicates the spread of scores in the distribution. 10.5

Inter-Districts Differences

Table-3
Average Percentage Score by Region/District

| District/Region | Mean Score | Rank |
|-----------------|------------|------|
| Karachi Cant. | 72 | 1 |
| Lahore | 57 | 2 |
| Khyber Agency | 48 | 3 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 44 | 4 |
| Islamabad | 42 | 5 |
| Quetta | 38 | 6 |
| Peshawar | 35 | 7 |
| National | 48 | - |

Mean percentage score among the districts is significantly different at p .05

The students of Karachi have the highest average percentage scores in mathematics followed by Lahore whereas, the low average percentage scores are obtained by the students of Peshawar and Quetta. The students of Karachi and Lahore have higher average percent score than the national average whereas students of the rest

of the districts have scores below the national average. A significant difference is observed among the districts in the mean percentage score.

Table-4
Significant Difference among Districts in Mathematics

| | Karachi | Lahore | Khyber | Gilgit | Islamabad | Quetta | Peshawar |
|-----------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|
| Karachi | - | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Lahore | * | - | - | * | * | * | * |
| Khyber | * | - | - | - | - | - | * |
| Gilgit | * | * | - | - | - | - | - |
| Islamabad | * | * | - | - | - | - | - |
| Quetta | * | * | - | - | - | - | - |
| Peshawar | * | * | * | - | - | - | - |

*The mean difference is significant at $p < .05$.

A significant difference is observed in the average percentage scores of Karachi with all the other districts. A significant difference is also observed in the average percentage scores of Lahore with four low scoring districts. The four low scoring districts, Gilgit, Islamabad, Quetta and Peshawar, do not differ significantly from each other. The three high scoring districts Karachi, Lahore and Khyber Agency, on the other hand, significantly differ from each other.

Students' Achievement by Area


It is observed that the urban students have significantly outperformed their rural counterparts in mathematics at the national level. In most districts, the urban students performed better as compared to the rural students. In Quetta and Islamabad, the rural students have obtained 21 and 20 percent points respectively lower than the urban students. The performance of the urban students is better than the rural students in mathematics. District-wise Average Percentage Score in Mathematics by Area is given in table-5.

Table-5
District-Wise Average Percentage Score by Area

| District/Region | Urban | Rural | Total |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Karachi Cant. | 72 | - | 72 |
| Lahore | 57 | - | 57 |
| Khyber Agency | - | 48 | 48 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 47 | 42 | 44 |
| Islamabad | 52 | 32 | 42 |
| Quetta | 48 | 27 | 38 |
| Peshawar | 40 | 30 | 35 |
| National | 56 | 37 | 48 |

The mean difference by location is significant at $p.05$.

Figure 3



Gender Differences in Students' Performance

The table 6 indicates that the girls' performance has been better than the boys in mathematics at the notational level. The mean percentage score by gender differs significantly. It is important to note that except for Islamabad and Quetta in all the other districts, boys have outscored the girls. The following table and figure indicate the district-wise mean percent score in mathematics by gender.

Table-6
Average Percentage Score by Gender

| District/Region | Mean Score | Rank |
|-----------------|------------|------|
| Karachi Cant. | 72 | 1 |
| Lahore | 57 | 2 |
| Khyber Agency | 48 | 3 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 44 | 4 |
| Islamabad | 42 | 5 |
| Quetta | 38 | 6 |
| Peshawar | 35 | 7 |
| National | 48 | - |

The mean difference by gender is significant at $p < .05$.

Table-7
Students' Performance by Gender and Area

| Location | Gender | % Mean | SD | 1 st Quartile | 3 rd Quartile |
|----------|--------|--------|----|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Urban | Male | 53 | 25 | 32 | 71 |
| | Female | 58 | 17 | 45 | 71 |
| | MF | 56 | 21 | 42 | 71 |
| Rural | Male | 37 | 16 | 26 | 47 |
| | Female | 37 | 20 | 18 | 55 |
| | MF | 37 | 18 | 24 | 50 |

It is observed from table-7 that the urban students of both sexes have performed better than their rural counterparts in mathematics. Urban girls have got the highest scores whereas no gender gap is observed in the performance of the rural students. A difference is observed on 25th percentile between the urban girls and boys whereas no gender gap is observed on 75th percentile among the students. The performance of the rural boys is better than the rural girls on 25th percentile but on 75th percentile the performance of the rural girls is better than their rural counterparts.

Performance of Students on Urdu Test

The results of the Urdu test are presented in the following tables. It is evident that the mean percentage score in Urdu is 60 (60% questions correctly answered). The distribution is negatively

skewed which shows that the performance of most of the students is quite satisfactory. About 37% of the students have scores above 75% whereas 40% of the students have scores below 50%. The frequency distribution can be seen in the following table and figure.

Table-8
Frequency Distribution of Score

| Score | Urdu | |
|--------|--------|------|
| | Number | Mean |
| 1-25 | 79 | 17 |
| 26-50 | 122 | 38 |
| 51-75 | 117 | 65 |
| 76-100 | 186 | 89 |
| Total | 504 | 60 |

Table-8 indicates that 40% of the students' score ranges from 1% to 50% whereas 60% of the students' score is above 50%. About 16% of the students score is below 25%. The high scorers are 37% of the students whose score ranges from 76% to 100% with mean score of 89%. The performance of the majority of students is quite satisfactory.

Figure 5




Figure (5) shows that the distribution of the test score is negatively skewed, which indicates that the performance of the

majority of the students is quite satisfactory on the test. About one third of the students, on average, correctly answered upto 40% of the questions. The distribution reveals that 88 students correctly answered 80% of the questions, which are the highest number of students in distribution for obtaining that score. The distribution also indicates that 39 students managed to obtain hundred percentage score.

Table-9
Distribution of Test Score

| Statistics | Mathematics |
|--------------------------|-------------|
| Mean | 60 |
| Median | 63 |
| Mode | 98 |
| SD | 28 |
| 1 st quartile | 35 |
| 3 rd quartile | 85 |
| Skew ness | -.279 |

The results presented in table-9 indicate that the mean and median scores are 60% and 63% respectively. The modal value of the distribution is 98%. Twenty-five percent of the students have scores below 35% and 75 percent of the students have scores below 85%.

Inter Districts Differences

Table-10
Average Percentage Score by Region/District

| District/Region | Mean Score | Rank |
|-----------------|------------|------|
| Karachi Cant | 89 | 1 |
| Lahore | 74 | 2 |
| Islamabad | 65 | 3,5 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 65 | 3,5 |
| Quetta | 53 | 5 |
| Khyber Agency. | 36 | 6 |
| Peshawar | 34 | 7 |
| National | 60 | - |

Mean percentage score among the districts is significantly different at $p < .05$

It is observed from table-10 that the students of Karachi have got the highest score followed by the students of Lahore whereas the students of Peshawar and Khyber Agency have got the lowest score. Students of four districts have scores that are higher than the national percentage mean score whereas three districts scores below the national average. A significant difference is observed among the districts in the mean percentage score.

Figure 6




Table-11
Table of Significant Difference among Districts

| | Karachi | Lahore | Khyber | Gilgit | Islamabad | Quetta | Peshawar |
|-----------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|
| Karachi | - | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Lahore | * | - | * | * | * | * | * |
| Khyber | * | * | - | * | * | * | * |
| Gilgit | * | * | * | - | * | * | * |
| Islamabad | * | * | * | * | - | * | * |
| Quetta | * | * | * | * | * | - | * |
| Peshawar | * | * | * | * | * | * | - |

*The mean difference is significant at $p < .05$.

From table-11 it is noticed that the performance of the students of Karachi is significantly different from the rest of the districts. A significant difference is observed in the average

percentage scores of Lahore with Karachi and three low scoring districts. The two low scoring districts Peshawar and Khyber Agency do not differ significantly from each other whereas the two high scoring districts Karachi and Lahore significantly differ from each other.

Students' Achievement by Area


The urban students have significantly outscored their rural counterparts in Urdu at the national level. In most districts the urban students have performed better than the rural students. The striking difference in the average percentage score between the urban and rural students is found in Islamabad where the rural students scored 32 percent points lower than their urban counterparts. It is concluded that the performance of the urban students is better than the rural students. The results of the students in Urdu by are presented in table-12 and figure-7.

Table-12
Average Percentage Score by Location

| District/Region | Urban | Rural | Total |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Karachi Cant. | 89 | - | 89 |
| Lahore | 74 | - | 74 |
| Islamabad | 81 | 49 | 65 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 65 | 66 | 65 |
| Quetta | 59 | 46 | 53 |
| Khyber Agency | - | 36 | 36 |
| Peshawar | 40 | 29 | 34 |
| National | 71 | 44 | 60 |

Mean percentage score by area is significantly different at $p < .05$.

Figure 7




Gender Differences in Students' Performance

Table-13 indicates that the girl students have out performed the boy students by significant margin in Urdu at the notational level. It is noted that the girls performed better than the boys in all the districts except for Karachi and Lahore. The largest difference by gender is observed in Islamabad and Gilgit where the girls outscored the boys by 24 and 21 percent points respectively. The lowest difference of four percent points is observed in Khyber Agency where the girls performed better than the boys. The following table and figure indicate district-wise mean percent score in Urdu by gender.

Table-13
Average Percentage Score in Urdu by Gender

| District/Region | Boys | Girls | Total |
|-----------------|------|-------|-------|
| Karachi Cant. | 92 | 88 | 89 |
| Lahore | 75 | 71 | 74 |
| Islamabad | 53 | 77 | 65 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 56 | 77 | 65 |
| Quetta | 44 | 63 | 53 |
| Khyber Agency | 34 | 38 | 36 |
| Peshawar | 28 | 41 | 34 |
| National | 51 | 68 | 60 |

Figure 8



Students' Performance in Urdu by Gender and Area

It is observed from the table-14 that the urban students of both sexes have outperformed their rural counterparts. The urban girls have the highest scores in Urdu. The rural girls have performed better than the rural boys by 18 percent points. On 25th percentile the urban girls outscored their rural counterparts by 29 percent points and on 75th percentile by six percent points. The rural girls have performed better than the rural boys on both 25th percentile and 75th percentile. It is noted that the performance of the rural boys is very poor as compared to the performance of the rural girls.

Table-14

Percentage Mean Score and Percentile at National Level by Location and Gender

| Location | Gender | % Mean | SD | 1 st Quartile | 3 rd Quartile |
|----------|--------|--------|----|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Urban | Male | 64 | 29 | 38 | 92 |
| | Female | 77 | 17 | 67 | 90 |
| Rural | MF | 71 | 24 | 58 | 90 |
| | Male | 36 | 18 | 21 | 46 |
| | Female | 54 | 27 | 29 | 81 |
| | MF | 44 | 24 | 25 | 63 |

Performance of Students on Science Test

The results of the Science test are reported in the following tables of this section. It is observed that the mean percentage score in Science is 65 (65% questions correctly answered). The distribution

is negatively skewed which indicates satisfactory performance of the majority of the students. About one fourth of the students are high achievers. Their score is above 75% although only eight percent of the students have scores below 25%. The score of the majority of the students (i.e. 70%) lies in the limit of 26% -75%. The frequency distribution can be seen in the following table and figure.

Table-15

Frequency Distribution of Score

| Score | Science Number | Mean |
|--------|----------------|------|
| 1-25 | 42 | 30 |
| 26-50 | 146 | 53 |
| 51-75 | 203 | 70 |
| 76-100 | 113 | 85 |
| Total | 504 | 65 |

It is observed from table-15 that the score of 37% of the students lies in the range of 1% - 50% whereas about two-thirds of the students score is above 50%. The score of eight percent of the students is below 25% whereas 22% of the students are high achievers and their score is above 75%. The performance of the majority of the students is quit satisfactory.

Figure 9




Figure-9 indicates that the distribution of the test score is negatively skewed, which shows that the performance of the majority

of the students is quite satisfactory on the test. About 12% of the students on average have correctly answered upto 40% of the questions. The distribution indicates that 123 students have obtained the mean percentage score of 70, which is the highest number of students in distribution for obtaining that score. The highest achievers are the 73 students who got 90 mean percentage score in the distribution.

Table-16
Distribution of Test Score

| Statistics | Mathematics |
|--------------------------|-------------|
| Mean | 65 |
| Median | 66 |
| Mode | 63 |
| SD | 19 |
| 1st quartile | 54 |
| 3 rd quartile | 77 |
| Skewness | -.570 |

Table-16 indicates that the mean and median scores are 65% and 66% respectively. The modal value of the distribution is 98%. One-fourth of the students have scores below 54% and three-fourths of students have scores below 77, which indicates that the performance of the students in the Science test is quite satisfactory.

Inter Districts Differences

Table-17
Average Percentage Score by Region/District

| District/Region | Mean Score | Rank |
|-----------------|------------|------|
| Karachi Cant. | 82 | 1 |
| Lahore | 79 | 2 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 71 | 3 |
| Islamabad | 63 | 4 |
| Quetta | 60 | 5 |
| Peshawar | 53 | 6 |
| Khyber Agency | 50 | 7 |
| National | 65 | |

Mean percentage score among the districts is significantly different at $p < .05$

The students of Karachi have obtained the highest score in Science followed by the students of Lahore and Gilgit. The students of Peshawar and Khyber Agency are at the two-bottom most positions in the ranking order. The score of the students from Islamabad and Quetta lies in the middle positions of the ranking order. The students of the three districts in the upper most positions of the ranking order, obtained higher score than the national average, whereas, the students from the rest of the districts have scores that are lower than the national average. A significant difference is observed among the districts in the mean percentage score.

Figure 10




Table-18
Significant Difference among Districts

| | Karachi | Lahore | Khyber | Gilgit | Islamabad | Quetta | Peshawar |
|-----------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|
| Karachi | - | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Lahore | - | - | * | * | * | * | * |
| Khyber | - | - | - | * | * | * | * |
| Gilgit | - | - | - | - | * | * | * |
| Islamabad | - | - | - | - | - | * | * |
| Quetta | - | - | - | - | - | - | * |
| Peshawar | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

*The mean difference is significant at $p < .05$.

From table-18 it is noted that there is no significant difference between the mean percentage scores of the students from Karachi and Lahore whereas significant difference is observed in the mean percentage scores of the students of Karachi with the remaining

districts. A significant difference is observed in the average percentage score of the students of Lahore with the students of Khyber Agency, Islamabad, Quetta and Peshawar. The two low scoring districts Peshawar and Khyber Agency do not differ significantly from each other.

Students' Achievement by Area

The urban students have performed better than their rural counterparts in Science at the national level and the difference is significant. In most districts, except for Gilgit, the performance of the urban students is better than the performance of the rural students. A considerable difference is observed in the performance of the urban and rural students of Islamabad where rural students scored 24 percent points lower than the urban students. It is concluded that the performance of the urban students is better than the rural students in Science. The following table and figure show district-wise Average Percentage Score in Science by Area


Table-19
Average Percentage Score by Location

| District/Region | Urban | Rural | Total |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Karachi Cant. | 82 | - | 82 |
| Lahore | 79 | - | 79 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 68 | 74 | 71 |
| Islamabad | 75 | 51 | 63 |
| Quetta | 64 | 55 | 60 |
| Peshawar | 55 | 51 | 53 |
| Khyber Agency | - | 50 | 50 |
| National | 72 | 56 | 65 |

Mean percentage score by area is significantly different at $p < .05$

Figure 11

Science Score by Location



Gender Differences in Students' Performance


It is observed from table-20 that the girl students have performed better than the boy students in Science at the national level. The performance of students by gender is significantly different. It is noted that the girls have outscored in all the districts except for Lahore. The largest gender gap is observed in Gilgit and Islamabad where the girls have outperformed the boys by 18 and 14 percent points respectively. The marginal difference of two percent points is observed in Khyber Agency where girls have performed better than the boys. The following table and figure indicate district-wise mean percent score in Science by gender.

Table-20
Average Percentage Scores by Gender

| District/Region | Boys | Girls | Total |
|-----------------|------|-------|-------|
| Karachi Cant. | 80 | 82 | 82 |
| Lahore | 80 | 76 | 79 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 63 | 81 | 71 |
| Islamabad | 56 | 70 | 63 |
| Quetta | 55 | 65 | 60 |
| Peshawar | 49 | 57 | 53 |
| Khyber Agency | 49 | 51 | 50 |
| National | 60 | 70 | 65 |

Mean percentage score by gender is significantly different at $p < .05$

Figure 12



Students' Performance by Gender and Area

It is observed that the urban students of both sexes have outperformed their rural counterparts. The urban girls have the highest scores in Science. The girls have outscored the boys in both locations in Science. The urban girls outscored their rural counterparts on 25th percentile by 20 percent points and on 75th percentile by 11 percent points. The urban boys have also outperformed rural boys on both 25th percentile and 75th percentile. The rural boys have performed poorly as compared to the performance of the rural girls.

Table-21
Location and Gender-Wise Distribution of Percentage Mean Score at National Level

| Location | Gender | % Mean | SD | 1 st Quartile | 3 rd Quartile |
|----------|--------|--------|----|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Urban | Male | 68 | 18 | 57 | 80 |
| | Female | 76 | 12 | 69 | 85 |
| | MF | 72 | 16 | 63 | 83 |
| Rural | Male | 51 | 16 | 40 | 63 |
| | Female | 61 | 20 | 49 | 74 |
| | MF | 56 | 19 | 43 | 69 |

Composite Score

The raw scores of each student in three subject tests are summed up in order to get the composite score. The results in section are based on composite scores.

Composite Performance of Students on Test

It is observed that the mean of the composite percentage score is 58. The distribution is slightly negatively skewed. About one fourth of the students obtained a score above 75% and eight percent students got a score below 25%. The score of the majority of the students (i.e. 40%) is in the range of 51% -75% with the mean percent score of 63. The frequency distribution can be seen in the following table and figure.

Table-22
Frequency Distribution of Composite Score

| Score | Number | Mean |
|--------|--------|------|
| 1-25 | 42 | 20 |
| 26-50 | 146 | 39 |
| 51-75 | 203 | 63 |
| 76-100 | 113 | 85 |
| Total | 504 | 58 |

It is observed from table-22 that the score of 37% of the students falls in the range of 1% - 50% whereas about two-thirds of the students score is above 50% which indicates that the majority of the students performed quite satisfactorily. The score of eight percent of the students is below 25% whereas the score of 22% of the students is above 75%, which shows that the number of high achievers is greater than the low achievers in the composite score.

Figure 13




Figure-13 shows that the distribution of the test score is slightly negatively skewed, which indicates that the performance of the majority of the students is satisfactory. About 28% of the students, on average, correctly answered up to 40% of the questions. The distribution indicates that the score of one-third of the students lies in the range of 60-75 mean percentage score. Only three students obtained the lowest score (i.e. on average correctly answered 10% questions) although 22 students got 95 mean percentage score that is the highest in the distribution.

Table-23
Distribution of Composite Score

| Statistics | Composite Score |
|--------------------------|-----------------|
| Mean | 58 |
| Median | 58 |
| Mode | 73 |
| SD | 21 |
| 1 st quartile | 40 |
| 3 rd quartile | 74 |
| Skewness | -.131 |

It is observed from table-23 that the distribution is having the same value of mean and median although the modal value of the distribution is 73, which is 15 percent higher than the mean and median value. The data is on interval scale; therefore the best

measurement indicator is mean and median. One-fourth of the students score is below 40% and three-fourths of the students score is below 74%, which indicates that the performance of the most of the students in composite score is satisfactory.

Inter Districts Differences

Table-24
Average Percentage Composite Score by Regions/District

| District/Region | Composite score | Rank |
|-----------------|-----------------|------|
| Karachi Cant. | 81 | 1 |
| Lahore | 70 | 2 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 60 | 3 |
| Islamabad | 57 | 4 |
| Quetta | 50 | 5 |
| Khyber Agency | 43 | 6 |
| Peshawar | 40 | 7 |
| National | 58 | - |

Mean percentage score by gender is significantly different at $p < .05$

The results reported in table-24 indicate that the students of Karachi are the highest scorers in composite score followed by the students of Lahore and Gilgit and the scores of the students of these districts fall in the upper most positions of the ranking order. The students of Peshawar and Khyber Agency are at the two-bottom most positions in the ranking order. The scores of the students from Islamabad and Quetta are in the middle positions of the ranking order. A significant difference is observed among the districts in the mean percentage score.

Figure 14




Table-25
Significant Difference in Composite Score among Districts

| | Karachi | Lahore | Khyber | Gilgit | Islamabad | Quetta | Peshawar |
|-----------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|
| Karachi | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Lahore | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Khyber | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Gilgit | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Islamabad | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Quetta | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Peshawar | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |

*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$).

It is noted that the performance of the students of Karachi is significantly different from the performance of the students of the rest of the districts. A significant difference is observed in the average percentage score of the students of Lahore with the students of all the other districts except for Gilgit. No significant difference is observed between the performance of the students of Islamabad and Quetta where the score falls in the middle of the ranking order. The two low scoring districts, Peshawar and Khyber Agency do not differ significantly from each other.

Students' Achievement by Area


Table-26 reveals that the performance of the urban students is better than the rural students. The performance by area is significantly different. In most districts the urban students outscored their rural counterparts. A large difference in the performance by area is observed in Islamabad where the urban students scored 26 percent points higher than the rural students. The following table and figure show district-wise Composite Mean Percent Score by Area

Table-26
Composite Scores by Location

| District | Urban | Rural | Total |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Karachi | 81 | . | 81 |
| Lahore | 70 | . | 70 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 60 | 61 | 60 |
| Islamabad | 70 | 44 | 57 |
| Quetta | 57 | 43 | 50 |
| Khyber Agency | . | 43 | 43 |
| Peshawar | 44 | 35 | 40 |
| National | 67 | 45 | 58 |

Mean percentage score by area is significantly different at $p .05$

Figure 15



Gender Differences in Students' Performance


It is observed that the girl students performed significantly better than the boy students. It is noted that the girls outscored the boys in all the districts except for Karachi and Lahore. In Karachi, the boys performed slightly better than the girls by only three percent points. The largest gender gap is observed in Islamabad where the girls outscored the boys by 18 percent points. The following table and figure indicate district-wise composite mean percent score by gender.

Table-27
Composite Scores by Gender

| District | Boys | Girls | Total |
|---------------|------|-------|-------|
| Karachi | 84 | 81 | 81 |
| Lahore | 73 | 65 | 70 |
| Gilgit/Skardu | 55 | 67 | 60 |
| Islamabad | 49 | 66 | 57 |
| Quetta | 43 | 58 | 50 |
| Khyber Agency | 43 | 44 | 43 |
| Peshawar | 36 | 43 | 40 |
| National | 52 | 63 | 58 |

Mean percentage score by gender is significantly different at p. 05

Figure 16



Students' Performance by Gender and Area

It is observed that the urban students of both sexes have performed better than their rural counterparts on mean percent score. The urban girls obtained the highest mean percentage composite score. They also got the highest score on 25th and 75th percentiles. The urban boys performed better than their rural counterparts on both 25th percentile and 75th percentile. The highest variation is observed in the score of urban boys. The rural boys have shown the poorest performance and less variation are observed in their score.

Table-28
Location and Gender Wise Distribution of Composite Mean Scores

| Location | Gender | % Mean | SD | 1 st Quartile | 3 rd Quartile |
|----------|--------|--------|----|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Urban | Male | 62 | 23 | 46 | 81 |
| | Female | 71 | 13 | 62 | 82 |
| Rural | MF | 67 | 19 | 55 | 82 |
| | Male | 40 | 14 | 30 | 49 |
| | Female | 51 | 19 | 34 | 67 |
| | MF | 45 | 17 | 34 | 58 |

Teacher's Characteristics and Students' Performance

Impact of Teacher's Academic Qualifications on Students' Performance

The results given in table 29 indicate that the level of teacher's academic qualification has a positive impact on the students' achievement. In the urban areas, the teachers' academic qualifications seem to have more impact on the students' achievement than the rural areas. Students who have been taught by teachers holding BA/B.Sc degree are the highest scorers followed by the students who have been taught by matriculate teachers. The urban students who have been taught by teachers having Bachelor degree have the highest score followed by those students taught by matriculates whereas in the rural areas the students who have been taught by FA/F.Sc teachers are the highest scorers followed by those taught by matriculates. It seems that the academic qualification of teachers has a stronger influence on the performance of girls than the boys. The girl students who have been taught by teachers having B.A./B.Sc. degree got the highest scores. A significant difference is observed between the academic qualification of teachers and the composite scores of the students.

Table-29
Impact of Teacher's Academic Qualifications on Students' Performance

| Academic Qualifications | Location | | | Gender | | |
|-------------------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | Urban | Rural | Total | Boys | Girls | Total |
| Matric | 63 | 46 | 58 | 54 | 59 | 58 |
| FA/F.Sc | 55 | 50 | 52 | 44 | 55 | 52 |
| BA/B.Sc or Above | 72 | 41 | 60 | 53 | 78 | 60 |

Significant relationship observed at p .05.

Impact of Teacher's Professional Qualifications on Students' Performance

From table-30 it is observed that the professional qualification of teachers has an influence on the students' achievement. The students who have been taught by teachers having Certificate in Teaching (C.T.) have the highest score. It appears that the professional qualification of teachers has more impact on the urban students than the rural students particularly on those urban students who have been taught by either C.T. or B.Ed. teachers obtained the same score. But in the case of the rural students the performance of the students who have been taught by C.T. teachers is better than the PTC or B.Ed teachers. Professional qualification of teachers has an impact on both genders but the girl students taught by B.Ed. teachers have the highest score whereas the boy students taught by C.T. teachers have the highest score. A significant difference is observed between the professional qualifications of teachers and the students' achievement.

Table-30
Impact of Teacher's Professional Qualifications on Students' Performance

| Professional Qualifications | Location | | | Gender | | |
|-----------------------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | Urban | Rural | Total | Boys | Girls | Total |
| PTC | 61 | 41 | 53 | 48 | 60 | 53 |
| CT | 74 | 50 | 65 | 68 | 63 | 65 |
| B.Ed. | 74 | 39 | 60 | 49 | 84 | 60 |

Significant relationship observed at .01 level of significance.

Teacher's Experience and Students' Performance

The students who have been taught by teachers having 16 years or more experience have the highest score followed by the students taught by teachers having 6-10 years experience. Teachers having 6-10 years of experience have a strong impact on the performance of both the urban and the rural students. Teacher experience between 1-5 and 11-15 years has only a modest influence on the students' achievement. Students of both genders taught by teachers having 16 years or more experience as well as 6-10 years experience have better score as compared to those students taught by teachers having experience of 1-5 years and 11-15 years. A significant difference is observed between the performance of students and the experience of teachers.

Table-31
Impact of Teacher's Teaching Experience on Students' Performance

| Experience in years | Student composite percentage mean score | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | Location | | | Gender | | |
| | Urban | Rural | Total | Boys | Girls | Total |
| 1-5 | 33 | 44 | 40 | 40 | . | 40 |
| 6-10 | 76 | 51 | 63 | 59 | 66 | 63 |
| 11-15 | 59 | 42 | 50 | 46 | 56 | 50 |
| 16+ | 70 | 32 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 |

Significant relationship observed at .05 level of significance.

Impact of Father's Education on Students' Performance

The father's education level is a significant factor on a child's performance. A consistence increase in the mean percentage score of students is observed with the increasing level of education of their fathers. However a decline in the score is observed of those children whose fathers are M.A./M.Sc. The level of father's education has more impact on the urban students than on the rural students. The level of father's education has more influence on a boy's performance than a girl's. A significant difference is observed in the mean achievement scores of students with fathers having different levels of education.

Table-32

Impact of Father's Education on Students' Performance

| Level of Education | Location | | | Gender | | |
|--------------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | Urban | Rural | Total | Boys | Girls | Total |
| Illiterate | 64 | 41 | 53 | 59 | 47 | 53 |
| Primary | 68 | 46 | 56 | 66 | 48 | 56 |
| Middle | 64 | 50 | 58 | 64 | 50 | 58 |
| Matric | 67 | 48 | 62 | 66 | 54 | 62 |
| FA/F.Sc | 67 | 60 | 65 | 67 | 60 | 65 |
| BA/B.Sc | 82 | 47 | 76 | 81 | 57 | 76 |
| MA/M.Sc or above | 68 | 45 | 59 | 68 | 45 | 59 |

Significant relationship observed at .01 level of significance.

Impact of Mother's Education on Students' Performance

The level of mother's education is a crucial factor on a child's performance. A consistence increase in the mean percentage score of students is observed with increasing education level of their mothers. However, a declining trend is observed in the mean percent score of children as the level of the mother's education increases upto B.A./B.Sc. and M.A./M.Sc. As in the case of the father's education, the same trend has been observed that the level of mother education has had more impact on the urban rather than the rural students. The impact of the level of the mother's education has had more impact on the girls' performance than the boys' performance. A significant difference is observed in the mean achievement scores of students with mothers having different levels of education.

Table-33

Impact of Mother's Education on Students' Performance

| Level of Education | Location | | | Gender | | |
|--------------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | Urban | Rural | Total | Boys | Girls | Total |
| Illiterate | 64 | 45 | 55 | 52 | 60 | 55 |
| Primary | 65 | 44 | 58 | 47 | 64 | 58 |
| Middle | 68 | 60 | 66 | 58 | 70 | 66 |
| Matric | 77 | . | 77 | 64 | 80 | 77 |
| FA/F.Sc | 76 | 66 | 75 | 79 | 72 | 75 |
| BA/B.Sc | 77 | 29 | 69 | . | 69 | 69 |
| MA/M.Sc or above | 82 | 42 | 62 | 62 | . | 62 |

Significant relationship observed .01 level of significance.

Impact of Father's Occupation on Students' Performance

The father's occupation is a significant factor on a student's performance. It is observed that the children of businessmen and technicians are the highest scorers, whereas the children of government servants, Labourers and farmers are the lowest achievers. It is surprising to note that the children of government servants and the children of Labourers have the same score. The father's occupation has more of an impact on the performance of the urban students as compare to the rural students. The father's occupation also has more of an impact on the performance of girls than the boys. A significant relationship is observed between the father's occupation and the student's performance.

Table-34

Impact of Father's Occupation on Students' Performance

| | Location | | | Gender | | |
|---------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | Urban | Rural | Total | Boys | Girls | Total |
| Govt. Servant | 63 | 45 | 55 | 50 | 59 | 55 |
| Business | 73 | 44 | 66 | 59 | 73 | 66 |
| Laborer | 65 | 45 | 55 | 52 | 63 | 55 |
| Farmer | 72 | 47 | 55 | 51 | 62 | 55 |
| Technician | 66 | . | 66 | 58 | 67 | 66 |
| Private Job | 80 | 44 | 62 | 59 | 65 | 62 |

Significant relationship observed at .05 level of significance.

Impact of Physical Facility on Students' Performance

The table No.35 indicates that black board; books for students, drinking water and boundary wall are significant determinants on students' performance. These facilities have a modest impact on the students' achievement.

Table-35
Impact of Availability of Physical Facility in the School on Students' Performance

| Availability of Physical Facilities | Mean % Score |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Black Board | 58 |
| Chalk | 49 |
| Tats for students | 52 |
| Drinking water | 60 |
| Boundary wall | 60 |
| Building Condition | Kacha 52 Pakka 58 |
| Books for students | 59 |

The availability of chalk, black board, boundary wall and drinking water in a school has a significant impact on the students' performance. It is also important to note that having chalk, black board and boundary wall also affect the students' performance. It is also observed that the availability of tats in a school is not a very significant factor on the students' performance, whereas the remaining factors such as chalk, black board, boundary wall and drinking water are the main determinant factors on the student performance.

Table-36
Availability of Physical Facilities in School

| Chalk | Black Board | Boundary Wall | Drinking water | Tats | Mean % Score |
|-------|-------------|---------------|----------------|------|--------------|
| ✓ | | ✓ | | | 60 |
| ✓ | ✓ | | | | 58 |
| ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | 61 |
| ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | 62 |
| ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | 56 |
| ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ | 52 |
| ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | 49 |
| ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 53 |

Discussions and Conclusions
Students' Performance in Mathematics, Urdu and Science

Mean percentage score in Mathematics, Urdu, and Science is 48, 60, and 65 respectively. Performance of most of the students in mathematics is poor whereas it is quite satisfactory in Urdu and Science. The urban students have performed significantly better than the rural students in all subjects. Girls' performance is significantly better than the boys in all the subjects including mathematics in which boys usually have performed better than girls. Students of Karachi and Lahore are the high achievers in all subjects whereas the students of Peshawar and Khyber Agency are the low achievers.

Since 1995, an improving trend has been observed in the students' performance in Mathematics, Urdu and Science. However, findings of the current study show a decline of 10 percent points in the students' score in Mathematics as compared to the score reported by AEPAM's previous study (2000). A decline of 12 percent points has also been observed in the average percent score in Urdu and 7 percent points in Science as compared to the score reported by the earlier study (2000). The decline in the students' performance may be attributed to sample size and other factors. However, the results reported by this study are consistent with the results (mean percent score) reported by MSU study (1995). AEPAM study (2000) indicated that the boys performed better than the girls in Mathematics whereas the girls performed better in Science and Urdu. The current achievement study supports the results regarding better performance of the girls over the boys in Urdu and Science but does not support the results that the girls did better than the boys in Mathematics. AEPAM study (2000) shows that the urban students performed better than the rural students in all the subjects including mathematics and their findings are consistent with this study.

On the whole, we do not have enough evidence to claim that significant deviation has taken place in overall student performance over the past ten years. Although urban students performed better than their rural counterparts and girls appear to have performed better than boys. The study has some challenging implications for future investigations regarding the disparity in performance of the urban and rural students as well as boy and girl students. Factors, which appear to have influence on the lifestyles of the urban and rural students in terms of having, access to basic facilities in school and at home need further exploration. These findings will provide viable

policy options to decision makers for narrowing down such disparities. These two parameters need to be further looked into so that an understanding about the dynamics of this phenomenon can be developed.

Composite Score

The raw scores of each student in three subject tests were summed up to in order get the composite score. The following results in section are based on composite scores.

Composite Performance of Students

The mean composite percentage score is 58 and the distribution is slightly negatively skewed which indicates that the performance of the students in composite score is satisfactory. The students of Karachi are the highest scorer followed by the students of Lahore and Gilgit whereas the students of Peshawar and Khyber Agency are the lowest scorers. A significant difference is observed among the districts in the mean percentage score. The performance of the urban students is significantly better than the rural students. In most districts except for Gilgit, the urban students outscored their rural counterparts. The girl students performed significantly better than boy students. The girls outscored boys in all the districts except for Karachi and Lahore where the boys slightly performed better than the girls by only three percent points. It is observed that the students' performance on composite score follow the same trend as for the other subjects and no major deviation is observed.

Teacher's Characteristics and Students' Performance

Teacher's academic qualification has a positive impact on the students' achievement and it has had more influence on the performance of the urban than the rural students. The students taught by teachers holding BA/B.Sc degree have the highest scores followed by the students taught by matriculate teachers. The urban students taught by teachers having Bachelor degree have the highest scores followed by those students taught by matriculates. Whereas in the rural areas, the students taught by FA/F.Sc teachers have highest score followed by those taught by matriculates. Girl students taught by teachers having B.A./B.Sc. degree have the highest score. A significant difference is observed between the academic qualification and composite score of the students. The findings of this study are consistent with the findings reported by the

Harvard study on "Teacher Training in Pakistan: Value Added or Money Wasted" that the level of primary school teacher's formal education has a positive impact on the achievement of the students. The difference in scores of the urban students and rural students taught by teachers having BA/B.Sc and FA/F.Sc qualifications, needs further investigations to establish causality of this happening, that is why BA/B.Sc teachers are not as effective as FA/F.Sc teachers in rural areas.

It seems that the professional qualification of teachers positively affects students' achievement. For example, students taught by teachers having Certificate in Teaching (C.T.) obtained the highest score. The professional qualification of teachers has more impact on the urban than the rural students. Professional qualifications of teachers do have a positive impact on both genders but the girl students taught by B.Ed. teachers secured the highest score. In case of the boys, those taught by C.T. teachers got the highest score. Thus a significant difference is observed between the professional qualifications of teachers and the students' performance. This study however does not support the findings of Harvard study (1989), which showed that teacher certification did not improve the classroom practices used by teacher and it has only a modest influence on the achievement of their students. This may be explained by the time lag between the two studies i.e. ten years. In addition reforms introduced in teacher education since 1990, may be responsible for improvement in teacher education – this yet another aspect that may be of interest for further exploration.

As for the relationship between teacher's experience and students' performance is concerned, the students taught by teachers having 16 years or more experience have the highest score followed by the students taught by teachers having 6-10 years experience. Teachers having 6-10 years of experience have a strong impact on the performance of both urban and rural students whereas teachers having 1-5 and 11-15 years experience have modest influence on students' achievement. A significant difference is observed between the performance of the students and the experience of teachers. Apparently, teachers are more effective for the first 10 years of their service, and later become ineffective. This may be due to the fact that the primary school teachers reach the maximum of their scales in the first 10 years of their service after which there is no opportunities for their promotion. The experience bracket of 16 years and above may be related to senior teachers in BPS 16 with more

job satisfaction, which has positive impact on students' performance. They, therefore, have interest in teaching and seem to be more effective teachers. Policy makers should seriously consider enhancing the entry qualifications of teachers and opening up the ladder of promotion to primary school teachers.

Impact of Father's and Mother's Education on Students' Performance

With regard to the impact of the father's education on the student's performance, it has been found there is a consistence increase in the mean percentage score of students with the increasing levels of education of their fathers. However, a decline in the score is observed regarding those children whose fathers are M.A./M.Sc. qualified. The levels of father education seem to have more impact on the urban students than the rural students. Level of the father education has more influence on the performance of the boys than the girls. A significant difference is observed in the mean achievement score of students with fathers having different levels of education. The main reason for decline in the score of those students whose fathers are MA/M.Sc may be their fathers have no time to coach their children at home. The high score of boys suggests father's preference towards the boy's education.

A consistent increase in the students' achievement is observed with the increase of the level of mother's education up to Matric but the students' score decreases as the level of the mother's education increases (i.e. FA/F.Sc upto MA/M.Sc.). The level of the mother's education seems to have more impact on the urban than the rural students because a constant increase in the students' achievement score with the increase of the level of mother's education is observed in the urban areas. The level of the mother's education has more impact on the performance of girls than the boys, which indicates that perhaps the mothers are giving preference to girls' education. A significant difference is observed in the mean achievement score of the students with the level of mother's education. The findings of this study are consistent with the findings reported by MSU, which indicates that literacy of both parents do have a positive impact on their children score. The current study has found that children of educated mothers have better scores. Emphasis on female education will ensure more girls in schools with better scores and this in turn will have greater impact on reducing the

gender gap. Education for girls up to secondary schools appears to be of fundamental importance.

Impact of Father's Occupation on Students' Performance

A significant relationship is observed between the students' achievement and the fathers' occupation. The children of businessmen and technicians have scored higher than the children of government servants, laborers and farmers. It is surprising to note that the children of government servants and the children of laborers have more or less the same scores. Apparently, father's occupation in urban areas has more impact on students' performance. While considering performance of boys and girls in relation to the father's occupation, it has more impact on the girls. To understand this occurrence, further studies are needed.

Impact of Physical Facility on Students' Performance

The availability of chalk, black board, boundary wall, and drinking water in school as well as the availability of books has a positive impact on the students' achievement. The availability of tats in the school has a modest impact on the students' achievement whereas the remaining factors such as chalk, black board, boundary wall and drinking water have a positive impact on the achievement. The findings of this study do not support the findings reported by Harvard study entitled "Do Differences Between Schools and Between School Administrators in Pakistan Contribute to Differences in Student Achievement?" which reported that no reliable relationships exist between the presence or absence of school facilities and scores on achievement tests.

Conclusions

- National score in mathematics is 48%, for Urdu it is 60%, and for Science it is 65%. The performance of children in Urdu and Science is satisfactory whereas their performance in mathematics is quite low.
- Students of Karachi and Lahore are the high achievers in all subjects whereas the students of Peshawar and Khyber Agency are the low achievers in most of the subjects. In all the subjects the urban students have performed significantly better than the rural students. In Islamabad a striking difference in the performance of the urban and the rural students is observed. Girls' performance is significantly

better than the boys in all the subjects including mathematics where traditionally the boys performed better than the girls.

- The mean composite score is 58%, which indicates that the performance is satisfactory. Students from Karachi have the highest composite percent score followed by the students from Lahore whereas students from Peshawar and Khyber Agency have the lowest score.
- The performance of the urban students is significantly better than the rural students in the composite percent score. The girl students' performance is significantly better than the boy students' in the composite percent score.
- Teacher's academic qualification has a positive impact on the students' achievements. It has more influence on the performance of the urban than rural students. Students taught by teachers holding B.A./B.Sc. degree have the highest score. The professional qualifications of teachers also have a positive impact on the students' achievement particularly on those students who have been taught either by C.T. teachers or B.Ed. teachers. The students taught by teacher having 6-10 years of experience and 16 years or more experience has a strong impact on the student's achievement.
- A consistent increase in the main percentage score of the students is observed with the increasing level of parental education upto BA. /B.Sc. in the case of the father's education and upto Matric in the case of the mother's education. A decline in the score of those children, whose fathers are MA/M.Sc, is observed. Student's score decrease as the level of mother's education increases after Matric from F.A./F.Sc. to M.A./M.Sc. Level of father's education has a strong impact on the boy's achievement whereas the level of the mother education has a strong impact on the girl's achievement.
- The availability of chalk, black board, boundary wall and drinking water in school as well as students having books has a great influence on the student's achievement.

Implications

Findings of the study cannot be generalized because of the small sample size. The study has identified some crucial factors affecting the quality of education, which need further exploration through research studies. Further study needs to be undertaken with an adequate sample size on regular basis.

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IMF ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE BACK

Humeira Iqtidar

It appears that the heady days when multilateral agencies such as the IMF and World Bank could assume that every body will automatically fall in line with policies of economic liberalization, deregulation and privatization of public resources are coming to an end. As the movement against corporate globalization grows around the world, the agencies that acted as 'facilitators' of this phenomenon are increasingly having to justify their actions. One such attempt at defending a key facilitator of corporate globalization, IMF, was made Kenneth Rogoff, Director of research at the IMF (2003), in an article titled, 'IMF strikes back'. That Rogoff has felt the need to defend this institution indicates the waning legitimacy of the International Monetary Fund and its sister organization, the World Bank.

Mr. Rogoff identifies and then responds to four main criticisms of the IMF. These criticisms are:

- 1- IMF loan programs impose harsh fiscal austerity on cash-strapped countries
- 2- IMF loans encourage financiers to invest recklessly, confident the fund will bail them out (the so-called moral hazard problem)
- 3- IMF's advice to countries suffering debt or currency crises only aggravates economic conditions
- 4- The fund has irresponsibly pushed countries to open themselves up to volatile and destabilizing flows of foreign capital.

While criticisms of the IMF and its handling of various crises abound, Rogoff has carefully selected these, perhaps not wanting to 'dignify' others which are more political in nature (such as the notion that the IMF is essentially a component of the American imperialist agenda). In any case, it is to his chosen criticisms and counter-arguments that I respond in this paper.

Debt Repayment Rather Than Long Term Stability

Responding to the first criticism Mr. Rogoff acknowledges that IMF programs impose harsh austerity programs on countries but he suggests that this is less strict a discipline than the market would impose. He claims that countries only come to IMF when they are desperate and IMF generally helps shorten the crisis. For instance, he focuses on the example of South Korea and Thailand in 1997, and states if the IMF had not stepped in, their currency devaluation would have been drastic and they would have faced default of loans.

In doing this, Mr. Rogoff completely ignores the above market rate premiums that IMF actually imposes on loan repayments. Additionally, he is using the international capital market as his reference point for judging whether the IMF's impositions are stricter than the market or not. However, a country could decide to isolate itself to some extent from the international capital market and not choose to expose itself to that level of harsh discipline, if the IMF did not dictate its policies. In fact, as Dr. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist at the World Bank and Noble laureate, has argued in his book *Globalization and its Discontents* (YEAR), the countries that have benefitted from globalization are actually those that chose policies at their own pace and for their own benefit, rather than having them imposed upon them by the international financial institutions (IFIs) of which the IMF is a central member¹.

Mr. Rogoff's argument is much more fundamentally undermined by the realization that his yardstick for measuring success is primarily whether a country remains in a condition to repay loans continuously or not. His exclusive focus on macro economic indicators and balance of payments implies that it is not important from IMF's point of view that people in South Korea committed suicide in mass numbers and that the austerity plans imposed prolonged the misery of unemployment to the extent that the country is still in an unstable condition. Indeed, in Korea a whole range of IMF related words has entered the lexicon. 'IMF syndrome' refers to the fear of losing ones job and not finding another. 'IMF Fashion' refers to second hand clothing. The 'IMF Era' refers to a 'period of national humiliation.' The 'IMF Sale' is a bargain for few buyers². What is important to IMF is that the country got back to a stage where it could continue paying back foreign loans. His definition of success

includes no aspect of human loss or sustainable long-term development.

It is true that the IMF only acts as a short term lending agency for countries that face crisis and that it is not the job of the IMF to 'develop' the under-developed countries, but it is also totally counterproductive to its stated aims of helping the troubled countries if it leads those countries into deeper troubles than the ones it was called in to help with. No doubt, IMF loans helped Korea in perhaps shortening the first and immediate tide of the crisis. However, over the medium term it has become apparent that the strings these loans came attached with are making sustained recovery difficult.

Ghana is an example of how once a country becomes dependant on IMF loans and starts following the prescribed policies, it loses sight of long-term sustainable development. A so-called success story of IMF policies, it was directed by the IMF to focus on timber export as its competitive strength. Ghana is now officially deforested and from being an exporter of timber is now an importer³. Under IMF tutelage, Ghana also privatized state resources, ended various subsidies to local industry and agriculture and the per capita income is now less than half of its per capita income in 1970s.

Bailing Out International Capital At the Expense of Taxpayers

The second criticism is related to the fact that the prospect of an IMF bail out makes private lenders lend where they would not have if they did not expect the IMF to help out later, leading to a greater debt crisis for a nation. In Russia in 1998, for example, the official community threw money behind a fixed exchange-rate regime that according to Mr. Rogoff, was patently doomed. Eventually, IMF cut the cord and allowed a default, proving wrong those many private investors who thought Russia was "too nuclear to fail." But if IMF had allowed the default to take place at an earlier stage, Russia might well have come out of its subsequent downturn at least more quickly and with less official debt.

In his response to this criticism, Mr. Rogoff's primary concern is for the lenders and not for the borrowing countries. The lenders invariably are large banks and investment houses. It is no secret that in Latin America, Africa and Asia, these investors have time and again used the IMF to pressurize governments to provide conditions

conducive to their operations in developing countries. But a fundamental question is why do they invest in developing countries at all? Do they invest to help in their development? The fact of the matter is that as western economies reach a mature growth rate, and as an affluent but aging population saves more and more money for retirement, the investment houses and banks need new markets to invest in to maintain the illusion that the high growth rates they promised when soliciting accounts are possible. This is why the most lucrative sectors in developing countries like health and education are being privatized and opened to foreign investment under pressure from IMF and WTO.

As many have argued, in this context the IMF works as the advance guard of the WTO, using the carrot of loans or the stick of loan recall to pressurize countries to liberalize their economies. In December 1997, the IMF's bailout program for South Korea included the following, very revealing, statement: 'Timetables will be set, in compliance with WTO commitments, at the time of the first review, to eliminate the import subsidies; eliminate restrictive import licensing; eliminate the import diversification programme; and streamline and improve the transparency of the import certification procedures.' The Indonesia bailout package speaks of 'liberalization of foreign trade and investment' as a condition for the IMF secured monies⁴. Essentially this is the start of a vicious circle in which the country under IMF tutelage is likely to become increasingly enmeshed in a cycle of liberalization leading to exploitation by large multinationals, instability and further reliance of the ruling junta on IMF loans to prop up the economy.

Coming back to second criticism of the IMF identified by Mr. Rogoff, it is true that the 'moral hazard' problem in itself is not a significant problem in all situations. In fact, as Dr. Ha-Joon Chang has shown, economic history shows that the cost of some potential moral hazards, like limited liability, industrial policy and lender-of-last resort (a category of which the IMF is a member) is more than offset by the advantages to capitalist development. In fact, capitalism would not have developed in the way it did, without some of these institutions. Chang contends, "...to put it more provocatively, capitalism has developed on the basis of moral hazard. The exact institutional form taken was different (limited liability, lender of last resort facility, industrial policy, etc.), but the principle was the same -socialization of risk⁵. In the case, of the Asian economies, Chang has shown that the

problem was not so much the moral hazard of international investors expecting to be bailed out by the IMF, but more likely of liberalizing too quickly, especially in the financial markets.

Mr. Rogoff completely ignores a more fundamental question at the heart of the matter: Whom exactly does the IMF bail out, and with whose money? We need to understand exactly how the fund works to really assimilate the magnitude of this problem. The IMF works as a short term lending facility for countries that are facing loss of liquidity and inability to pay back their creditors. When the IMF intervenes in a crisis, monetary and fiscal austerity is not sufficient to get all the creditors paid back immediately. That is where the second part of the IMF agreement comes in. The IMF loans the debtor country enough money to pay off what it calculates will be the unpayable portion of the outstanding loans coming due. In other words, they provide a "tide over" loan to avoid defaults, which will supposedly be repaid once the beneficial effects of the austerity measures-that is the effects beneficial to creditors-kick in.

This bailout of international investors whose loans had become unpayable is supposed to serve the dual purpose of sparing them losses from risky investments and also to prevent panic from spreading to other parts of the international credit system. As part of its bail-out program, the IMF also tries to convince private investors to make new loans to the troubled country. This has the advantage of reducing the amount that the IMF would have to come up with. Of course, the easiest investors to convince are the ones that have already made loans to that country. The chance of recuperating some of the loan through additional lending is better than having to write off the loan altogether.

A critical question here is, where did the IMF get the money to loan \$17.2 billion to Thailand, \$58.2 billion to Indonesia, \$22 billion to Russia, and \$42.3 billion to South Korea⁶? That is from where does the IMF get its money? The IMF is not an international central bank, like the national central banks. Those central banks are banks of last resort in the sense that they have, theoretically, an unlimited capacity to make new loans in their national currency. The IMF gets its money from the "assessments" of member governments-- like the \$18 billion supplemental assessment the Clinton administration lobbied Congress to approve in light of the Asian crisis. In other words, the

IMF budget comes from the taxpayers of member nations, and any interest the IMF receives from loaning those taxpayers' money.

So, if the IMF can always be counted on to rescue the international investors, then does that mean that there is no risk? Does the risk disappear? Of course that is not the case. First, even when the IMF does come to the rescue there is no guarantee that it will be there in time to prevent some default of loans. For instance, Russia did default in spite of IMF attempts to protect the international credit and finance system from this shock. More importantly, there is the risk that despite the best attempts to turn a troubled economy into a debt payment machine, the economy will deteriorate further and not be able to pay the loans due later, including the new ones made by the IMF. The risk still exists but who assumes this risk? Not the private investors, but the IMF and who is the IMF but the taxpayer of the member countries who have paid the assessment amounts to the IMF's budget.

In cases where the IMF loans themselves are not repaid, the taxpayer has paid off the international lenders by assuming their risk and losing their own loan. Even in cases where the IMF loans are repaid, taxpayers of member countries subsidize international lenders who receive a risk-inflated rate of return when in fact it is the taxpayers who end up assuming the risk.

The problem then is that IMF policy is not designed to help the majority in troubled economies in the first place. It is intended to help international creditors in the short run, and increase returns on global capital in the long run. So IMF bailouts are not bailouts of debtor countries and their economies at all. That's just a popular misconception that some find convenient to let pass uncorrected. IMF bailouts are bailouts of international investors because that is who gets the money. It is a great charade of our times in which the international investors get paid by the taxpayers' money.

Prolonging Recessions

Third, critics charge that the IMF pushes countries to increase domestic interest rates when cuts would better serve to stimulate the economy. The IMF also stands accused of forcing crisis economies to tighten their budgets in the midst of recessions. These are policies that the developed countries, especially the US do not and did not

follow in similar situations but are imposing upon the developing countries.

Dr. Joseph Stiglitz brilliantly illustrates this argument. Dr. Stiglitz's removal from the World Bank is a now famous episode that serves to underline the very limited amount of tolerance that the IFIs have for criticism. Dr. Joseph Stiglitz is no radical, and still a strong proponent of free market solutions but nevertheless he is a relatively honest academic within the paradigm he believes in.

In his book, *Globalization & Its Discontents*, he details that deregulating domestic financial institutions and rewriting laws for open access to international capital makes emerging-market economies vulnerable to highly erratic shifts in investor behavior, and confers no long-term benefits. He maintains, further, that foreign direct investment destroys otherwise viable domestic companies, while the privatization of state assets destroys essential social services or makes them prohibitively expensive for the poor that comprise the majority of populations in emerging-market nations. Stiglitz shows that those developing nations that have opened themselves to trade by deregulating financial markets and privatizing national assets have experienced far greater social and economic turmoil than growth. He maintains that, instead of development, progress and growth, the result of IMF strictures and conditionalities has been devastation and unsustainable levels of debt⁷.

In an address to the Strategic Management Society in 1998, Dr. Stiglitz spoke at length about the fact that during the savings and loans crisis in the US in the 80s, the government bailed out the industry to save jobs and to prevent panic from spreading to other sectors of the economy. The US government has also cut interest rates and provided tax breaks to stimulate economic growth⁸. The very opposite of these policies was, and is still being suggested to troubled economies in similar situations. In fact, as Dr. Chang contends, the bail outs of the Korean companies in crises, often criticized by the IMF and mainstream economists, were in fact very effective because the management team was replaced and the government would essentially act as a centralized re-distribution agency. In contrast, during the Long Term Capital Management (a hedge fund) bail out recently in the US, the US government did not remove incumbent management, which was a very bad signal as far as improving responsibility within the industry is concerned.

Within the US economy, interest rate changes of quarter of a percentage point are debated and worried over in terms of their impact on the economy and employment. The Fund routinely suggests higher interest rates for developing countries with far less robust economies than the US. A key justification of these rate increases is said to be that they will motivate employment seekers from low value jobs to high value jobs. Although the high interest rates may be justified due to concerns for inflation but a single-minded focus on inflation means that the resultant lack of new enterprise formation and hence job creation is ignored. Thus, rather than moving workers from low productivity jobs to high productivity jobs, they are moved from low productivity jobs to unemployment.

Mr. Rogoff's defense on this point is to blame the countries involved in not making provisions for harder days in advance. That is no defense at all since any solution recommended by IMF is only useful if it takes into account the situation of the country as it stands. Devising a solution to the country's actual problems and shortcomings is more important than claiming that a set of principles be adhered to in all situations. The IMF's dogmatic adherence to a set of policy decisions regardless of their suitability to the country is part of a colonial mindset, according to Dr. Stiglitz, where Fund officials are already sure of the remedy they will propose before even discussing the problem. In an article he summarizes, "...the IMF pushed policies that exposed countries to serious risk. One might have thought, given the evidence of the costs, that the IMF could offer plenty of evidence that the policies also did some good. In fact, there was no such evidence; the evidence that was available suggested that there was little if any positive effect on growth. Ideology enabled IMF officials not only to ignore the absence of benefits but also to overlook the evidence of the huge costs imposed on countries"⁹.

Capital: Made Free to Flee

Fourth, Mr. Rogoff states that critics such as Columbia University economist Jagdish Bhagwati have suggested that the IMF's zeal in promoting free capital flows around the world planted the seeds of the Asian financial crisis. In principle, had banks and companies in Asia's emerging markets not been allowed to borrow freely in foreign currency, they would not have built up huge foreign currency debts, and international creditors could not have demanded

repayment just as liquidity was drying up and foreign currency was becoming very expensive.

Mr. Rogoff's defence again is to blame the governments of the involved countries. For example, he claims that in the months leading to Thailand's currency collapse in 1997, IMF reports on the Thai economy portrayed in stark terms the risks of liberalizing capital flows while keeping the domestic currency (the baht) at a fixed level against the U.S. dollar. According to him, Thai authorities didn't listen, still hoping instead that Bangkok would become a financial center like Singapore. However, first we must realize that there is a clear difference between IMF reports and active policy suggestions. IMF reports have no binding authority, while IMF policy suggestions do.

More significantly, there is no clear way of assessing the 'implementation problem'. The agency problem in implementing policies that do not evolve democratically is immense. It is very difficult of course to assess whether a policy is inherently unsuitable or whether the implementation tactics had serious limitation, until we compare data across different countries. As we do so, we realize that the IMF has suggested relatively consistently the same set of principles under the structural adjustment plan. Their failure in bringing the desired results must stem therefore, from an inherent flaw in the logic and not implementation. It is also critical to reiterate that the undemocratic methodology of the IMF makes it really easy to predict the failure of its policies.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Rogoff has chosen Jagdish Bhagwati to respond to, because by and large, Bhagwati is a strong supporter of neo-liberal economics. His criticism is primarily of tactics and implementation strategies, and not of the fundamental paradigm. An analysis of the IMF *raison d'être* and policies at the fundamental level only goes to show that IMF is not a body of neutral, non-political body of technical experts providing advice to the countries of the world. It is in placing IMF in a vacuum, in divorcing it from the real political-economic context in which it operates, that there lies the greatest danger of not understanding its role in the system. While it is easy for Mr. Rogoff to base his defence of the IMF primarily on the corrupt and unrepresentative governments of the countries the IMF provided its advice to, there is no hiding the fact that many of these unrepresentative regimes have been propped in place by the funding provided through the IMF. It is easy to blame them when they fail, but

it is not so easy to erase the evidence of IMF role in forming their policies and rewarding their flawed, anti-people policies with more loans.

The Case of Argentina.

Argentina is an interesting example of not just how a healthy, rich country was devastated under IMF tutelage, but also of how ordinary citizens have the power to rise above the problems created for them by their local and international elites.

All through the 1990s, opinion makers such as the Financial Times hailed Argentina as the 'star pupil' of the IMF¹⁰. The national GDP rose by 60% over the decade, and foreign investment poured in. However, these glorious figures hid some other gory details. Today more than 50% of Argentina's population lives below the poverty line. Between 1989 and 1999, national debt rose by \$80bn and unemployment soared from 6.5% in 1989 to 20% in 2000, underemployment rose to 15%¹¹. The wealth flowing into Argentina during the 1990s was a combination of speculative finance and one-off sales: the phone company, the oil company, the rails, and the airline. After the initial cash infusion all that was left was "a hollowed out country with costly basic services and a working class that was not working"¹².

What was the IMF's role in all this? The Generals who ruled Argentina during the 70s and 80s received massive doses of loans and advice from the IMF in how to re-organize the economy. In 1977 Rodolfo Walsh, an investigative journalist published an Open Letter From A Writer to The Military Junta, one of the most famous pieces of writing in modern Latin America now. In it Walsh declared that the physical terror, 'disappearance' of dissidents, was not "the greatest suffering inflicted on the Argentinean people, not the worst violation of human rights which you have committed. It is in the economic policy of this government where one discovers not only the explanation of the crimes, but a greater atrocity which punishes millions of human beings through planned misery". He outlines the crimes: "Freezing wages with rifle butts while prices rise at bayonet point, abolishing all forms of collective bargaining, prohibiting assemblies and internal commissions, extending working days, raising unemployment,...an economic policy dictated by the International Monetary Fund, following a recipe applied indiscriminately in Zaire of Chile, in

Uruguay or Indonesia¹³". Soon after posting copies of his letter, Walsh was shot dead by the police in Buenos Aires. The generals were rewarded handsomely for these activities. In 1976 and 1977 Argentina revived more than \$2bn in foreign loans, more than the country had received in all of the preceding six years combined.

Once it became unsustainable to support a military dictatorship for internal and external reasons, the reins of power were handed over to a ruling clique that continued the implementation of IMF dictated policies. Under President Menem's rule, the country went through a 'surgery without anesthesia' and for a while in the 90s the consumption among the upper classes rivaled that of the well heeled in New York and London. However, the strains of a hollowed out economy began to show and by 2001 the patience of not just the working class, but of the newly impoverished middle class ran out and they turned out into the streets. It seems hard to define exactly what it was, because none of the mainstream political parties organized these demonstrations, but the so-called *Argentinazo* was a spontaneous outpouring of the people. They just left their homes to gather in the capital banging pots and pans, or to block highways refusing to go the government to negotiate asking instead for the government to come to them. Within the next 12 days, the country went through five presidents and defaulted on its \$95bn debt, the largest default in history.

This is by no means the end of the story. Elections are expected in April and there is no guarantee that the country will not be returned into the hands of the same people in the absence of a large organized alternative. However, there is significant development in the setting up of an alternative economy of co-operatives that deal with each other and provide equitable employment¹⁴. In addition, there is increased political activity and discussion about political and economic alternatives. These neighborhood forums called *asambleistas* are also throwing up new people in the leadership arena.

Conclusion:

In the final analysis, Mr. Rogoff's attempt at a riposte is not only factually incomplete but also severely limited in its scope. As noted above, his decision to address not the fundamental questions but the more superficial ones is critical in exhibiting the Fund's inability to provide honest answers to those. More significantly, it is

important to reiterate that the fact that the institution has been moved to make this kind of a defense is an important trend in world politics. It is to the credit of the anti-corporate globalization movement, the movement for justice and equality, that these institutions are becoming answerable regarding their policies and politics.

The change in the international political scene, the increasing loss of legitimacy of the IMF is not lost on its one time ardent supporters who are increasingly distancing themselves from it. For instance, Jeffrey Sachs, an economist who worked with IMF to liberalize Russia after the break up of the Soviet Union declared in 1997, "However useful the IMF may be to the world community, it defies logic to believe that the small group of 1,000 economists on 19th Street in Washington should dictate the economic conditions of life to 75 developing countries with around 1.4bn people." He goes on to say, "IMF is the Typhoon Mary of today, spreading recession in country after country".

NOTES

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A ROAD MAP FOR DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

Iram Khalid

The new wave of democratic trends, as witnessed in the present era, assigns greater value to the democratic process. The key questions are that how far a democratic system reflects its principles in letter and spirit? Is it democratic, semi democratic or illiberal democracy? Such an assessment of the political system can be better undertaken by focusing on the dimensions of political culture of the concerned systems. An examination of the attitudes and behaviour of the individuals and the institutions or political collectivities to understand their orientations in the political process becomes necessary. Traditionally, the institutions that represent and mobilize society in the political sphere include legislature, political parties, and financial institutions. They help to shape, organize and express political culture and identities. Family, community and peer groups, ethnic and religious institutions have also assumed a greater role in the institutional manifestation and express political attitudes and culture.

Some Traits of Pakistan's Political culture can be pointed out by looking at the framework of democratic values like tolerance, accommodation, trust and moderation. Furthermore, the explanation of Pakistan's political culture becomes necessary for proper understanding of the role of democracy in the politics of Pakistan. The Pakistani political scene has experienced democratic, authoritarian and military regimes and the heritages of British judicial and administrative values, including norms that underlie parliamentary practices remain visible.¹

Some generalized traits of Pakistan's political culture can be identified. Culture is neither static nor does it enjoy permanence. If social and political conditions change, it certainly effects on the political culture,² which is a strong product of its past, with its roots in British Raj. British government paid a special attention to establish and strengthen the state, institutions like military and bureaucracy, while intentionally kept the development of the public and political institutions under their direct supervision.

A constitution commission headed by a former chief justice Mohammad Shahab-ud-Din, was appointed in 1960, to examine the cause of the failure of democracy in Pakistan. According to the commission, the main reasons for the failure of democracy in Pakistan were: (i) lack of proper elections, (ii) undue interference by the heads of the state with the ministers and political parties and by the central governments with the functioning of the government of provinces, (iii) lack of leadership resulting in the absence of well-organized and disciplined parties, lack of character in the politicians and their undue interference in the administration.³

Islamic ideology remained the central theme of freedom movement. After independence the gap between theory and practice hindered to establish the political structure for the nation. The gap is so widened now that the nation is struggling to maintain itself free from the clutches of sectarianism. Geographical facts also became a serious matter of concern of Pakistani rulers. The feelings of the Bengalis, Sindhi, Punjabi and Pakhtun surfaced on the ground and challenged the integration of the country. Especially, after the emergence of Bangladesh, there developed a dispersive environment, which contaminated the political culture of Pakistan. In this context, the name of Islam was exploited.

After independence Pakistani politics revolves around military, bureaucratic and feudal elites. In the twenty first century, the country is once again experiencing military rule. Although the concept to consider military as the agent of political development does not exist but the current regime is making efforts to introduce a new model of governance. Bureaucracy with its strong inheritance and being the only trained hierarchical institution has always played multifunctional responsibilities. Under the control of the Feudals the Pakistani politicians normally consume their energies on internecine dissensions. They normally interrupted the socio-economic programmes introduced by the governments, because the efforts to change the societal structure do not favor their interests. This class believes in set pattern of attitudes.

Absence of stable democracy and civic values in Pakistan lies in the absence of permanent political institutions. When state institutions perform the role of legislation then generally people feel alienation from these policies, as they are not included in the process.

They do not find any context with the system in the absence of political parties. This distrust enhances the identity crisis in the individuals. The problem comes on the scene when the boundaries of state and nation considered different from each other, it promote the sense of insecurity among the people.

For country like us, the most important requirement is the rule of law. How many people believe in their judicial system, and are satisfied with the implementations of laws? What is the concept of justice in the society? Is this organ performing its duties without any pressure? This shows the lack of confidence on judicial institutions. Involvement of judiciary in politics is another issue. "Judicial activism" and judicial review was used more for meddling in political matters rather than for furthering the social and public rights of constitutions⁴ of 1956, 1962 were scrapped - and twice suspended or held in abeyance the 1973 constitution by the military rulers. In the process, sanctity of the Basic Law and constitutionalism were destroyed. The strangulation of constitutionalism fostered the culture of oligarchy among the power elite of every section of society. The abolition of the first constitution made the later constitutions vulnerable to similar "onslaughts". Independence of judiciary is also affected under the shadow of martial laws and emergencies; the judiciary was obliged to legitimize every coup. Military also distorted the electoral process, an important mechanism that trained the citizens political parties and leaders, the democratic norms and culture and in electing their representatives with this lack of experience.

Political leadership has lost the confidence of common man. Horse-trading, rigging, "lota-crazy" (turn coats), were terms introduced by the political corruption during the last decade of Pakistani politics. The concept of the effectiveness of a vote lost its significance as well as utility. The people in general, during and between the elections, were largely disillusioned and as a result the otherwise strong instrument of hope was diminished. The system is still struggling with an electoral system, which produces anything but a participatory democracy. 'Our ruling elite continue to show signs of immaturity, lack of creativity and imaginations. For decades they have consolidated their own gains, but left the Pakistan ship adrift in turbulent waters.⁵

Strong and entrenched political parties act as the source of link between central, provincial and local structures. To fill the gaps between different segments of society is also the function of political

parties. The failure of constitutions and political process in Pakistan also contributed to this factor. 'Unfortunately, Political Parties in Pakistan have failed to develop into strong vehicles of national political will. They have generally been weak and unstable and are easily manipulated most of the political parties with top-heavy leaders but without any cadres at the grass root or the intermediate level.⁶ Persecution and victimization of political opponents is also another common phenomenon in Pakistan Politics.⁷ The abuse of authority and exercise of power for negative objectives is also the part of this scene.

When these political parties got the chance to be a part of legislature, what role they perform? Do they act as sovereign body? Subordinate or advisory? Do elections promote supremacy of the elected members over traditional authorities? During the first Benazir Bhutto government, frequency of sessions was so low, only 11 meeting were held. As in the case of Nawaz Sharif, during his 2nd term, 20 short sessions were held. Table 1 shows the pathetic role of the National Assembly as a body of independent thinking and autonomy. Electoral experience of Pakistan during 1985-1997, reveals a pattern; after each election (i.e., 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997), the political leaders not only gained greater autonomy, but become more vigorous in pursuing their supremacy. In the process, they were driven by the demands of their constituents and personal interest i.e., providing jobs to members of their constituency, promoting some developmental work through administrative help, seeking the removal of grievances of their voters and developing a personal connection with the public officials working their areas".⁸

Table 1
Details of the Sessions – 1985-1998

| Parliamentary Government 1985-1998 | National Assembly Sessions | Total Days | Average Duration Days |
|---|----------------------------|------------|-----------------------|
| Muhammad Khan Junejo P.M. 1985-88 | 15 | 545 | 36 |
| Benazir Bhutto P.M. 1988-90 | 11 | 218 | 20 |
| Nawaz Sharif P.M. 1990-93 | 17 | 417 | 25 |
| Benazir Bhutto P.M. 1993-96 | 31 | 525 | 17 |
| Nawaz Sharif P.M. Feb. 1997- March 1998 | 20 | 140 | 7 |

Source: News papers & Books compiled by author.¹⁷

Table 1 demonstrates the non serious attitudes of the Assembly members as these elected representatives have shown little or no interest in the deliberations of the assembly. Three years of Prime Minister Junejo's period 15 sessions were held and the number of days was 545. On the other hand 17 sessions of 417 days were held during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's era. The problem was the lack of interest shown by the members in the debates relating to the amendments of the Constitution and the issues related to National policies.

Table 2
Social Class Background of National Assembly Members

| | 1985 | 1988 | 1990 | 1993 | 1997 |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Landlords and Tribal Leaders | 157 | 456 | 106 | 129 | 126 |
| Businessmen/Industrialists | 54 | 20 | 38 | 37 | 39 |
| Urban Professionals | 18 | 9 | 46 | 26 | 32 |
| Religious Leaders | 6 | 15 | 11 | 8 | 3 |
| Rtd. Military Officers | - | 7 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| Others | 3 | - | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| | | 207 | 207 | 207 | 207 |

Source: Compile by Saeed Shafiq¹⁸

Table 3
Composition of Cabinets 1985-1998: Federal Ministers and Ministers of State

| | Feudals | Business / Professionals | Lawyers / Professionals | General | Women | Ulama | Minorities | Unidentified | Total |
|------------------------|---------|--------------------------|-------------------------|---------|-------|-------|------------|--------------|-------|
| M.K. Junejo 1985-88 | 12 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 27 |
| Benazir Bhutto 1988-90 | 15 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 4 | - | 1 | 6 | 44 |
| Nawaz Sharif 1990-93 | 12 | 9 | 12 | 1 | - | 1 | 2 | 2 | 39 |
| Benazir Bhutto 1993-96 | 17 | 3 | 13 | 2 | 1 | - | 1 | 2 | 39 |
| Nawaz Sharif 1997 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 2 | - | - | 1 | 26 |

Source: Several Gazette Notifications, Government of Pakistan, compiled by Saeed Shafiq.

The above-mentioned tables 2 and 3 present a true picture of the reflection of elite class in Pakistan. Feudals, lawyers/professionals and business groups continue to dominate the federal cabinet. M.K. Junejo's cabinet looked more representative. Feudals were more dominating during Benazir's both cabinets. While Nawaz Sharif's cabinet was dominated by business groups.

Trends in Political Culture

As the picture presented in Table 4, Pakistan with four martial laws, three imposed by military dictators (Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan, Muhammad Yahya Khan and M. Zia-ul-Haq) and the fourth by an elected civilian (Z.A. Bhutto) presented with a critical political experiment. Take-over by Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 1999 with Martial Laws imposed in portions of the country twice, first in March 1953 and then in April 1977 has also affected the image of Pakistan. 'No less tragic is the fact that civilian governments earned the stigma of introducing martial law in the country.⁹ In a brief political history, six out of eleven Heads of State were either soldiers or bureaucrats. Their cumulative tenure came to thirty-six years. Their performance in the power saddle included the 'dismissal of eight out of fifteen Prime Ministers, dissolution of seven out of ten National Assemblies, and banning five out of seven political parties were outlawed'¹⁰ as discussed in given below table 4.

Table: 4
Tenures of the national Parliament: 1954-1999

| Year | Parliament Dissolved by | Nature of Leadership | Dismissal of Government |
|------|--------------------------|--|-------------------------|
| 1954 | Ghulam Muhammad | Governor General (Bureaucrat) | M. Ali Bogra |
| 1958 | Sikandar Mirza | President (Bureaucrat) | Malik Feroz Khan Noon |
| 1969 | General Yahya Khan | C-in-C (Chief Martial Law Administrator) | General Ayub Khan |
| 1977 | General Zia-ul-Haq | C-in-C (Chief Martial Law Administrator) | Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto |
| 1988 | General Zia-ul-Haq | President | M. Khan Junejo |
| 1990 | Ghulam Ishaq Khan | President (Bureaucrat) | Mrs. Benazir Bhutto |
| 1993 | Ghulam Ishaq Khan | President | Mian Nawaz Sharif |
| 1996 | Farooq Leghari | President (Pol. Elite & Feudal Lord) | Mrs. Benazir Bhutto |
| 1999 | General Pervez Musharraf | C-in-C | Mrs. Benazir Bhutto |

Source: Compiled by the author

New Road Map

The cycle of experimentation of different forms of political systems was not able to introduce a sustainable target. This scenario provides a clear picture of main hurdle in the way of new road map for democracy, although Gen. Musharraf has completed the two stages. In stage-I, new system (devolution of power at local) has been operationalized. The government has already approved grants for the developmental projects to make the devolution plan a success. Nazims have got many administrative and financial powers. Sharing of power, i.e., instead of transferring to the elected members is the main characteristic of stage-II. A tussle between the MPAs and Nazims is also taking place. The undergraduate Nazims and the graduate MPAs (like in D.G. Khan) can be the part of controversies over the distribution of funds, because the financial issue remains always a critical point of getting further support in their constituency.

Pakistan experienced the local government system twice before. "Recognizing the need for an institutional basis of legitimating of state power, American experts worked with Pakistanis to hammer out a novel system of 'Basic Democracy' during Ayub Khan Regime. It was an imaginative scheme expertly designed to give a semblance of democratic legitimacy as well as linkages for the bureaucracy to plug into local level power structures".¹¹

Each village elected a basic democratic; a member of a union council covering of Union Councils was an ex-officio member of sub-district. Tehsil, or Thana Councils, provided by Tehsildar or SDO (Sub Divisional Officers) the official in charge of the Tehsil or Thana. All local officers were required to attend the meetings. Local power holders by passing politicians and Political Parties were had direct links with bureaucracy. Lot of funding was provided for the 'Rural works Programme'. However this provided a basis of extraordinary corruption and oppression.¹² As an alternative to 'Islam' as basis for legitimacy of his regime, Zia at first toyed with the idea of reverting to Ayub's system of 'Basic Democracy', which was so well suited for authoritarian manipulation. While at the same time introducing local level, 'Council' on which the system was based. However, given outraged reaction in the country he relinquished that idea, and established a 'party less' democracy.¹³

For the fourth time in the history of Pakistan, the national democratic order was derailed. The government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif

was dismissed on Oct. 12, 1999 and the constitution was suspended. Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf assumed control of the country as its Chief Executive with 7 points agenda. He promised to replace 'sham democracy with a genuine one. He took the control under the Provision Order (PCO) on June 20th 2001. Under Chief Executive Order 3, the Chief Executive was to hold office of President until his successors entered upon the office. Musharraf after assuming the new office announced, the change would augur well for the future of Pakistan. In a speech at the swearing in ceremony he said: I think I have a role to play; I have a job to do here; I cannot and will not let this nation down".

The Supreme Court justified the military take over of 12 October 1999. The court also ignored the bitter experience of the past when Zia as head of a military regime was allowed to amend the constitution. He made frequent use of this power and mostly in a wanton and irresponsible manner. He virtually changed the face of the constitution particularly when he introduced amendments/alterations/additions/substitution in 65 articles of the constitution under the Revival of the constitution of 1973 Order 1985 (RCO). Conferment of the same power on the Chief of Army Staff under the judgment of the 12 May 2000 raises a specter of similar abuse once again.¹⁴ The practice of tempering with constitution in Pakistan is old one.

Following the old practice, President Pervez Musharraf announced a package of 29 changes. "This is part of the constitution", he declared. The Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) has weakened the national and provincial assemblies and vested powers in the person of president. The LFO also gives the military a strong constitutional role through the National Security Council as well as changing the prominent features of the 1973 constitution to transform the parliamentary. The government prescribed their-in to a presidential one. Article 17 (Freedom of Association), 58-2(b) (Dissolution of National Assemblies), 59-1(b) (Change about the senate), 63 (Disqualification of the members of Parliament), 63 (p) (about the person who cannot run in the elections if he/she may be convicted from a court), 63 A (disqualification on grounds of defection), 73 (Procedure for money bills), 75 (President's assent to bill), 101 (appointment of governors), 152-A-1 (Creation of the National Security Council), 243 (Control of the armed forces), 270 AA

(Self validation). This article validates all orders, acts and laws passed by President Musharraf from 14, Oct. 1999.¹⁵

Nevertheless, it became clear that the transitions towards democracy in any society could not be explained by economic or other socio structural factors has often been stressed with a view to explaining different political development and deviations from the road to democracy. 'The philosophical foundations of democracy rest on the nations of popular sovereignty, participatory governance, and rule with consent. The power to form and change a government lies with the citizens who elect their representatives for setting up a government such a govt. is accountable to the people through their representatives who calls for equality of opportunity and protection of law for all citizens irrespective of caste, reed, region and religion. It allows freedom of expression and a right to setup political and other organizations within the framework of law and respect for dissent".¹⁶ The link between historical development and institution and cultural factors as an element explain what makes democracy work.¹⁷

Challenges to the System

The important and crucial stage-II of Pervez Musharraf's road map for democracy after the election Oct. 2002 has been completed. Now the question arises, whether the newly elected parliament suited to that map? The election results as given some interesting figures below prove that PMLQ's composition also provides analysts with a valuable reference to judge the sincerity of Gen. Musharraf's desire for change.¹⁸

Table 5

Chips off the old block **PMLQ MNAs with relatives who have an electoral history**

| Cons. # | Name | District | 1985 | 1988 | 1990 | 1993 | 1997 | Wins | Losses | Total |
|---------|---|------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------------|------------|------|--------|-------|
| 19 | Omar Ayub Khan Son of Gohar Ayub Khan | Haripur | NW IND | | NW LI | NW PMLN | NW PMLN | 4 | | 4 |
| 20 | Sardar Shahjehan Yousof Son of Sardar Mohammad Yousof | Manshera | | | NW/PW IND | NW PMLN | NW PMLN | 4 | | 4 |
| 57 | Malik Amin Aslam Khan Son Malik Mohammad Khan | Attock | NW IND | NW PPP | NL PDA | NL PPP | NL PPP | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| 59 | Eman Waseem Niece of Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain | Attock | NW IND | NW LI | NW LI | 2NL PMLN | NW PMLN | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| 60 | Maj. Tahir Iqbal Son of Lt. Gen. Malik Abdul Majid | Chakwal | NW IND | NW LI | NW LI | NW PMLN | NW PMLN | 5 | | 5 |
| 62 | Chaudhry Mohammad Sharboz Hussain Brother of Ch. Altaf Hussain | Jhelum | NL IND | NL PPP | NW PDA | | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 77 | Ch. Mohammad Asim Nazir Son of Chaudhry Nazir Ahmed | Faisalabad | NW IND | 2NW LI | NW LI | | | 4 | | 4 |
| 78 | Rajab Ali Khan Baloch Son of Nasir Ali Baloch | Faisalabad | NW IND | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| 90 | Samia Akhtar Bharwana Daughter of Mehr Akhtar Abbas Bharwana | Jhang | | | NL LI | | | | 1 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------------|---------------|---|---|---|
| 91 | Sahbazia Mohammad Mehboob Sultan Relative of Sahbazia Mohammad Nazir Sultan | Jhang | NL IND | | NW PDA | NW PPP | NL PPP | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| 99 | Rana Omar Nazir Khan Son of Rana Nazir Ahmed Khan | Gujranwala | NW IND | NW LI | NW LI | NL PMLN | NW PMLN | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| 100 | Chaudhry Bilal Ijaz Son of Ch. Ijaz Ahmed | Gujranwala | NW IND | NW LI | NL LI | NW PMLN | NW PMLN | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| 103 | Chaudhry Liaquat Abbas Bhatti Brother of Ch. Mehd Hassan Bhatti | Hafizabad | PW IND | PW LI | PW LI | PW/NW PPP | NL PPP | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| 113 | Ali Ajjad Malhi Son of Sikandar Hayat Malhi | Sialkot | | | | NL PMLN | NW PMLN | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 136 | Bilal Ahmed Virk Son of Ch. Tawakulullah Virk | Sheikhpura | | | NL PDA | NW PPP | NL PPP | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 141 | Sardar Mohammad Asif Nawal Son of Sardar Arif Nawal | Kasur | PW IND | PW LI | PW LI | PW PMLJ | PL/NL PMLJ | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| 155 | Mohammad Akhtar Khan Kanju Son of Mohammad Siddiq Khan Kanju | Lodhran | NW IND | NW LI | NW LI | NL PMLN | NW PMLN | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| 157 | Hamid Yar Hiral Son of Sardar Allah Yar Hiral | Khanewal | | | PW LI | PW PPP | PL/NL PPP | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| 166 | Dr. Junaid Mumtaz Joiya Relative of Man Mohammad Anjad Joiya | Pakpattan | | | | NW PPP | NL PPP | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 237 | Syed Ayaz Ali Shah Sherazi Son of Ijaz Ali Shah Sherazi | Thatta | | | | NL IND | NL IND | | 2 | 2 |

NW: Won in the National Assembly NL: Lost in the National Assembly PW: Won in the Provincial Assembly PL: Lost in the Provincial Assembly

Out of 89 MNAs, only about 20 per cent are new to parliamentary politics. While many amongst there are also making it to the national assembly for the first time, they have been players at the provincial level. This means that about 80 per cent of Gen. Musharraf's party consists of elements that have deep roots in the established political. It is a group that is characterized more by its survival instinct than any other aspect of politics. Indeed, if one goes through the list of those who were elevated from the provincial level, one can see at least 11 (or over 12 per cent) who had lost in 19997 and who politics was under serious threat locally. These also include PPP turncoats such as Ghulam Sarwar from Rawalpindi, Wasi Zafar from Faisalabad and Nawab Amanullah Khan from Lodhran.


Lastly, it is intriguing to note that one common thread that runs through this lot and in fact enable the military establishment to bring them together on one platform is their strong roots in biradari politics. Go through the list of PMLQ MNAs and it reads like a Who's Who of Pakistan's political biradaris. The Sardars, Maliks and Khans of northern Punjab, the Virks, Rais, Ranans and Bhattis of Central Punjab and the Kasuris, Nakais, Dreshaks, Khars, Maitlas, Khaggas, Manekas, Jats, Joiyas, Hirajs, Khichis, Qureshis Bukharis, Lalekas, Syeds and Makhdooms of southern Punjab are all there. An of course, toughest of the lost – the Chaudhrys – who constitute 13 per cent of the PMLQ parliamentary party. Indeed, of the 89 PMLQ MNAs, as many as 65 write their caste, biradari or tribe with their names.¹⁹

The other side of the picture is that introduction of increased participation of women in electoral process, enhanced the opportunities and restoration of joint electoral system could also be considered important contribution to democracy. The parochial and persona list character of Pakistan's political parties with their rapidly changing loyalties is another issue of serious concern.²⁰

Ideological debate with fragmented trends, increasing international pressures are still influencing Pakistan society. After the elections held in October, the international environment with the socio economic pressures in the presence of divided mandate are creating problems for the newly introduced structural changes. The outcome is again the institutional imbalance.

The poor performance of the state is shown in the recent political scene as the newly elected members still facing the challenges of civil society and state's coercive capacity. To settle the 'primordial' identities and their clash with Islamic mode, economic pressures and increase of unemployed population with un-planned education are still awaiting their resolution.

Challenges to Change



Conclusion

Lack of tolerance, failure to adjust the demands of modernization, conflict to accommodate different segments of society are the note worthy trends in Pakistan politics. It is the real show of low political culture with the performance shown by the parliaments, judiciary and political leadership.

Political parties are the basic element of successful process in a democratic regime. It's a matter of fact that they with the political leadership cannot be able to manage their role. By not focusing to train the people, the valuable trends regarding the working of democracy. To manage the political leadership who can consolidate

democratic norms in society is also another failure on the part of political parties. Political elite with their immature performance in the parliament is also a part of this uncertain and confused situation. "There are signs of discontent of middle classes in the urban centers, where resentment is growing against the in-effectiveness of democratically elected government to provide justice and security to citizens".²¹

Democracy in Pakistan is again in a transition period. Old faces have to compete new environmental trends to coop with structural change. So, there is a need that government should modify the map and make it possible for political parties to give suggestions about new set up. The ruling party should try to accommodate their political opponents. And opposition has to show the mature behaviour for the success of system. These confidence-building measures will strengthen the whole situation. Other wise traditional political culture of Pakistan may again be ready to trap this new road map for democracy.

NOTES

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¹² *ibid.*

¹³ *ibid.*

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¹⁸ The Herald, December 2002. pp:24-26.

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PAKISTAN'S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

Umbreen Javaid

Numerous factors shape a country's defence policy. The major among these include geo-strategic location of a country, nature of its territorial boundaries and pattern of relations with its neighbours. Though there have been revolutionary changes in means of communication, geography still plays quite an important role in influencing decisions on strategic options. Industrial development and the nature of military establishment quantity, quality of manpower weapons and equipment are important determinants of defence policy.¹ Since its inception, Pakistan has diverted a large section of its budget towards its defence requirements. This clearly shows the importance of security concerns of Pakistan, being a developing state this is being done at the cost of development and eradication of poverty.

The geo-strategic environment has caused serious defence problems for Pakistan as it is situated in the region described as the fulcrum of Asia, a region where Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan meet.² The defence policy of Pakistan is influenced by its geo-strategic location, security perceptions, and perceived threats. The region acquired great significance and came under the lime light of world media when the following events took place i.e. Revolution in Iran 1979, occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Union, 1980, Iran-Iraq war, 1980, India and Pakistan going nuclear, US attack on Afghanistan, 2001, and China emerging as a world power.

Pakistan maintains her importance due to nuclear potential, close proximity to oil rich Persian Gulf, influence in Afghanistan, historical links with Central Asia and borders with India and China.³ Pakistan has the unique distinction of being surrounded by three of the world's largest nations i.e. Russia, China and India. The 'geographical pivot of history' and strategically the most critical zone in Eurasia are formed by these states, which lie along the periphery of the great continental powers of Asia, Russia and China. As the

South-west Asian peripheral state, Pakistan's security is linked with Indian Ocean and Gulf. Afghanistan with its high mountain ranges and passes guards the strategic pathway to the sub continent. The Pakistan/Iran/ Afghanistan region provides a land corridor to any power to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The straits of Hormuz, characterized as the international oil highway, which connects the worlds largest site of oil reserves and production with world market is 250 miles off naval complex of Iran, Chah Bahar, which is about fifty miles west of Pakistan.⁴

Defence Allocation

For all nations of the world, rich and poor, security has a certain priority. In certain cases, the gravity of the security threat necessitates a continual increase of defence expenditure. The process of modernization is another factor that necessitates increased defence expenditure. In the case of South Asia both India and Pakistan have been faced with such necessities.⁵ There is a strong correlation between defence allocation and security. Since its inception, Pakistan had to deal with security concerns from its two longest borders with India and Afghanistan, for which, no matter which type of government has been there, there have always been large expenditures on defence. Huge defence allocations have been made in name of security, threats, deterrence etc.

Pakistan's concern about security has been a corner stone of its foreign policy as every leader has emphatically asserted that Pakistan's primary objective is security and the figures of the defence allocations have ranged between 30 to 70 percentages of the budgets.⁶ Even though Pakistan is a developing state with limited resources and earnings, but still a huge amount of budget is being diverting towards defence, which is at the cost of development in other sectors. This is basically due to the major security concerns of Pakistan.

Military has always been effective and was able to dominate the political scene of the country – even when it has not taken over the control of the government. The military being over grown has been successful in diversion of major share of budgets towards military expenditures. In addition to overt allocation for defence, some expenditure on defence and security is kept under cover, which may include roads, military hardware and equipment in aid.⁷ Every government has ensured provision of huge amounts towards defence, as to satisfy the powerful armed forces. As the defence

budget is not debated in the assemblies, it is taken as that the actual cost is far more than what is officially stated. Defence related expenditure is also not included in the defence allocation.

Due to major security concerns and to uplift the military, its modernization and up gradation of defence preparedness has been an area of highest national priority. The huge defence expenditure is a clear indicator that Pakistan has been seriously concerned about security. Pakistan's justification for high military expenditures emanates from the reasons that firstly, at the time of independence Pakistan had no ordinance factory and secondly, Pakistan had to establish its navy, air force and army. Then later on the ever-looming threat from India, forced Pakistan to go for high military allocations. The competition between the two led to large budget allocations for defence, which is very expensive for the developing Pakistan. For its survival Pakistan has to maintain effective deterrence with regard to India.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE PERCENTAGE 1947-2002

| Year | Allocation Millions | in | Percentage of Allocations |
|-----------|---------------------|----|---------------------------|
| 1947 - 48 | 236.0 | | 65.16 % |
| 1948 - 49 | 461.5 | | 71.32 % |
| 1949 - 50 | 625.4 | | 73.06 % |
| 1950 - 51 | 649.9 | | 51.32 % |
| 1951 - 52 | 792.4 | | 54.96 % |
| 1952 - 53 | 925.7 | | 56.68 % |
| 1953 - 54 | 637.2 | | 58.7 % |
| 1954 - 55 | 640.5 | | 57.5 % |
| 1955 - 56 | 917.7 | | 64.00 % |
| 1956 - 57 | 800.9 | | 60.1 % |
| 1957 - 58 | 854.2 | | 56.1 % |
| 1958 - 59 | 996.6 | | 50.9 % |
| 1959 - 60 | 956.5 | | 50.9 % |
| 1960 - 61 | 1112.4 | | 58.73 % |
| 1961 - 62 | 1108.6 | | 55.73 % |
| 1962 - 63 | 954.3 | | 53.16 % |
| 1963 - 64 | 1156.5 | | 49.49 % |
| 1964 - 65 | 1262.3 | | 46.07 % |

| | | |
|-----------|---------|---------|
| 1965 - 66 | 2855.0 | 53.67 % |
| 1966 - 67 | 2293.5 | 60.92 % |
| 1967 - 68 | 2186.5 | 53.53 % |
| 1968 - 69 | 2426.8 | 55.62 % |
| 1969 - 70 | 2749.1 | 53.35 % |
| 1970 - 71 | 3201.5 | 55.66 % |
| 1971 - 72 | 3725.5 | 59.09 % |
| 1972 - 73 | 4439.6 | 59.34 % |
| 1973 - 74 | 4948.6 | 42.03 % |
| 1974 - 75 | 6914.6 | 42.83 % |
| 1975 - 76 | 8103.4 | 46.00 % |
| 1976 - 77 | 8120.4 | 44.07 % |
| 1977 - 78 | 9674.5 | 42.46 % |
| 1978 - 79 | 10167.6 | 34.06 % |
| 1979 - 80 | 12654.8 | 36.31 % |
| 1980 - 81 | 15300.1 | 39.01 % |
| 1981 - 82 | 18630.7 | 43.22 % |
| 1982 - 83 | 24565.7 | 43.72 % |
| 1983 - 84 | 26750.9 | 38.10 % |
| 1984 - 85 | 29191.6 | 38.10 % |
| 1985 - 86 | 33663.1 | 26.78 % |
| 1986 - 87 | 38618.8 | 25.3 % |
| 1987 - 88 | 47015 | 26.1 % |
| 1988 - 89 | 51053 | 25.4 % |
| 1989 - 90 | 58708 | 26.5 % |
| 1990 - 91 | 64623 | 24.8 % |
| 1991 - 92 | 75751 | 23.6 % |
| 1992 - 93 | 87461 | 25.0 % |
| 1993 - 94 | 91776 | 25.2 % |
| 1994 - 95 | 104512 | 24.4 % |
| 1995 - 96 | 119658 | 23.1 % |
| 1996 - 97 | 127441 | 23.6 % |
| 1997 - 98 | 136164 | 21.5 % |
| 1998 - 99 | 143471 | 22.1 % |
| 1999 - 00 | 152794 | 20.5 % |
| 2000 - 01 | 131637 | 17.5 % |
| 2001 - 02 | 131637 | 15.6 % |

Pakistan's Defence Policy Towards its Neighbours

INDIA

Since the last fifty years Pakistan and India's relations can be categorized as tense or hostile but never friendly. Their relations have seen various phases of intense tensions, wars, rapprochement but never peaceful co-existence.

With its hegemonic designs and hostile posture towards Pakistan, India will continue to be the major security concern of Pakistan. The long enmity between India and Pakistan lies in the way the sub-continent got partitioned and the various differences and clashes both had before and after the partition. The enmity between Pakistan and India has grown with the passage of time rather than cooling down. There have been periods of hot war, cold war and detente between the two, but even during better times both look upon each other with great distrust and suspicion. There have been number of different irritants at different times between Pakistan and India, but Kashmir has been the most constant and contestant issue between the two, leading to wars between the two.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir has not added much to India's security or economy but has made Pakistan's defence vulnerable. Pakistan's only road and railway line, linking Lahore with Peshawar run parallel to the Kashmir border and distance between them is very short for many miles. Kashmir's only all weather road leads to Rawalpindi. Moreover, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, over which Pakistan enjoys sole right under the Indus Basin Water Treaty, enter Pakistan from Kashmir.

In the quest to attain more security, both Pakistan and India have depended on various quarters for military equipment and assistance. India's main providers have been Soviet Union and now USA, whereas Pakistan received military assistance from USA and China. The military balance between the two clearly tilts in favour of India. There is vast disproportionate in the military capabilities and weaponry, both qualitative and quantitative. The Indian's are far superior in land, air and naval forces. There is no doubt that India militarily dominates South Asia both in nuclear and conventional

capabilities. Through its military might, India bullies its weaker and smaller neighbours.

The Indian army is the fourth largest and Pakistan twelfth largest in the world. The Indian air Force and Navy are the largest in Asia. The idea of becoming a master of Indian Ocean is very much part of Indian strategy. The Indian Navy is expanding at a rapid pace. India's growing naval strength is likely to alter the geopolitical situation of the region.⁹

There have been three wars between Pakistan and India in 1948, 1965 and 1971. Even though all these were, short wars, but they brought great strains on the economies of both. In April 1984, fighting broke out between Indian and Pakistan forces over the possession of Siachen Glacier, which is approximately 1000 square miles in a remote Karakoram Mountain Range. Since then, there have been series of talks over the issue, but upto now no settlement has been reached. In May-July 1999, Kargil crisis brought Pakistan and India very close to war with each other. India demanded Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil heights, which had threatened India's supply routes to Leh and Siachen. Under international pressures Pakistan withdrew to restore the status quo position.

Initially India carried out the nuclear test in 1974 and Pakistan to secure nuclear deterrence went for nuclear explosion in 1998. Any use of nuclear weapons will lead to immense devastation to the thickly populated India and Pakistan. It is to be noted that the fulcrum of Pakistan's defence policy rotates around the threats poised by India. In the region India's intransigent attitude and desire to act as the big brother, dictating its terms to the smaller regional states has led these states, including Pakistan, to go for heavy defence expenditures. Pakistan in response to India's bullying stance has always refused to accept India's hegemonic designs.

India and Pakistan together constitute more than twenty percent of world's population, therefore for the maintained of regional and international peace these two countries should resolve their conflicting issues. The government of Pakistan and India are diverting a huge account of their budget on defence related expenditures; this is done on the cost of social and economic benefits of the people of both the countries.

A second equally obvious and immediate requirement is the strengthening of peacekeeping machinery on the lengthy border between India and Pakistan. One way to accomplish this is to upgrade the existing peacekeeping force, which is, the United Nations Observer Group in India and Pakistan, both in terms of members of personnel and the redesign and expansion of its present mission.¹⁰

IRAN

Iran is a country of high strategic importance and endowed with vast resources. Beside contiguous borders, it has much in common with Pakistan; there are strong religious, ethnic and cultural links between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.¹¹ Other than shared geography, Pakistan and Iran also share cultural, linguistic and religious bonds. Historically, there have been warm and friendly relations between the two states. These warm relations continued for many years and during this tenure these neighbours also became partners in defence alliance CENTO, which was formed in 1955 by United States during the Cold War. In 1964, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey formed Regional Cooperation for Development RCD. During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, Iran gave Pakistan a sufficient amount of military and financial help. Then in 1974 to combat the armed insurrection in Baluchistan, the government of Pakistan was provided assistance of Cobra helicopters along with pilots by the Shah of Iran. To lesser the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the issue of "Pukhtunistan" and Durand Line, in 1976-77, Iran provided its good offices. Regarding relations with Pakistan, after the Revolution, these have fluctuated between being better than normal to not-very-good.¹²

After Islamic Revolution in Iran, it developed highly antagonist relations with US, which was very close to the previous regime of the Shah. Pakistan growing close relations with United States were not appreciated by Iran especially during the occupation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan got the status of a front line state, whereas Iran, which was also a neighbour of Afghanistan and a equally affected party, felt left out during the Afghan crisis.

The emergence of independent states in Central Asia added a new dimension to this Pak-Iran competition for influence in neighbouring Afghanistan. Iran attaches great cultural, political and economic importance to Central Asia and wants to build pipelines, so

that a huge quantity of Central Asian oil and gas can be imported through Iran. Given Washingtons objections to pipelines that go through Iran and its preferences for Central Asian oil and gas to flow through Pakistan and Afghanistan, Tehran feels that Islamabad has consciously become part of US strategy of economic containment of Iran.¹³

It is a measure of Pakistan's one-sided military doctrine that as recently as 1992 experts described Iran as Pakistan's area for strategic depth. Because Pakistan lacks territorial depth vis-à-vis India, it has had to rely on Iran for tactical with drawl in case of war with India. During wars with India, Pakistani civilian and air force planes were stationed in Iran.¹⁴

Pakistan's abiding love for Iran arises from the fact that not only is Iran an immediate neighbour but also the mother of Pakistani culture.¹⁵ With a progressive new leadership in Iran and with a government in Pakistan which has taken drastic steps to control sectarian violence, there are bright chances that their relations will improve. Both the countries are members of ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), this forum can be utilized for more cooperation between Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan will have to go for serious efforts to bring back the warmth between the two countries. The differences between Iran and Pakistan can be lessened with more constructive talks and accommodating attitude of both, reviving back the good times.

AFGHANISTAN

Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Durand Line) has mountainous terrain and is about 1200 miles long. It was from the Sharikal range of the Pamirs in the north to the Iranian border at the Ko-i-Malik Siah. The main transit and trade routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan are through a number of passes in the mountain ranges dividing the two countries. These passes are also strategically important as military movement across the Durand Line has traditionally taken place through these passes. One of the passes, the Khayber Pass was the traditional invasion route to India.¹⁶ Even though both the neighbouring countries are Muslim states, but their bi-lateral relations have not been cordial. Since the establishment of Pakistan at different times various contested issues have emerged between the two. Very few years have seen good relations amongst Pakistan and Afghanistan.

This has continued to be the major irritant in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. On more than one occasion Pakistan and Afghanistan reached the brink of war on this issue in late fifties and early sixties. Twice their diplomatic relations were severed.¹⁷ There were occasional armed conflicts on the border.

Internally Afghanistan has been facing political and economic instability especially during 1970's, there were many change of governments, which all failed to establish themselves and exploited the government machinery leading to the misfortunes of the people which goes back to centuries. This enabled the neighbouring super power Soviet Union's military to enter and intervene inside Afghanistan in 1979. This changed the whole regional scenario. At this time Pakistan became the front line state for United States to counter and throw out the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Huge military, economic and political support was provided to Pakistan for the purpose. Pakistan received immense aid from other foreign quarters, which was mostly utilized to train the Afghan Mujahedeen, who along with equipment and training would go back to Afghanistan to fight the ongoing war with the Soviet troops inside Afghanistan. No doubt Pakistan played a pivotal role in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989.

As soon as the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, infighting broke out between the various Mujahedeen factions over the control of power. Various foreign countries supported these various groups, and thus this internal issue also included foreign involvement. Pakistan supported the Taliban, who were able to control much of Afghanistan. Islamabad's handling of the Afghan policy since 1978 onwards and more specifically since the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban in September 1996 has caused irreparable damage not only to the society of Pakistan, but also to its politics, economy and relations with Iran, Russia and Central Asian States.¹⁸ Pakistan acting too quickly recognized the Taliban regime. Pakistan's desperate attitude towards Afghanistan showed that it was very keen in having a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan, so that for trade, land routes through Afghanistan to Central Asian Republics may be opened, which was not possible because of the ongoing civil strife in Afghanistan.

It was again after September 11 attacks on USA that Pakistan regained the lost status of front line state. As now again USA needed Pakistan to carry out the attacks against Taliban and Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. With the attack on Afghanistan on October 7, by USA, Pakistan Policy towards Afghanistan took a U turn, and now that the Taliban regime has been removed and a caretaker set up is functioning in Afghanistan. The worries of Pakistan towards its western borders have again emerged. What will be the future setup in Afghanistan is yet to be seen.

Pakistan would like to see a stable Afghanistan for route to Central Asian Republics. From the defence point of view a secure and friendly western border will lessen the defence burden of Pakistan, who has to constantly face threats from India from the east. A close and a pro-Pakistan Afghanistan can provide strategic depth to Pakistan in case of a major attack by India on Pakistan. On the opposite, if there are strained relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the threat may linger on over Pakistan that if India attacks from the east there may be an attack from the west simultaneously, which may be devastating for Pakistan's defence.

CHINA

On January 4, 1950, Pakistan became the first Muslim country to recognize the Peoples Republic of China. But it was in 60's that the two countries came closer to each other, after the episode of Sino-India conflict in 1962. Pakistan and China entered into number of agreements i.e. Boundary Agreement in 1963, Air Services 1963 and cultural agreements in 1965. This was the beginning of cooperative relations between the two in economic, cultural, technological and military fields.

Since then their relations have developed from strength to strength. Bi-lateral cooperation grew in all fields and China played an important role in promoting industrial self-reliance in Pakistan. China also became a reliable source of military hardware during a period that saw growing western restrictions and embargos on Pakistan.¹⁹

Pakistan has a common frontier of about 400 miles with China in the Kashmir-Xinjiang region. It stretches from the tri-junction of Afghanistan, Pakistan and China to the Kara Kuram Pass.²⁰ Pakistan and China are close neighbours. The history of relations

between the two countries goes back to the period when merchants, pilgrims, scholars and diplomats traveled on camel or on horseback through the silk route from one country to the other.²¹

Since 1960's, Pakistan and China developed good relations in every field, even though they adhere to different ideologies. Then Pakistan had earlier joined CENTO and SEATO, the Western defense, alliances, this factor also did not become a matter of concern for China, who in these years was in the antagonist block of the west. There have been so many changes in the region, in the past fifty years, but the friendship between the two countries is "time tested" and "all weather" friendship, which seems to be flourishing with the passage of time.

Probably strategic and political considerations did more to influence the course of relations between China and Pakistan than any other factor. Soon it became clear to Pakistan that China is not an expansionist power. Pakistan supported the admission of China to the United Nations and other international bodies. Perhaps the most important development in the Pakistan-China friendship both from the military and commercial point of view was reopening of the silk route, linking Xinjiang with the Hunza valley in Pakistan, to traders in 1967. A year and a half later, Pakistani and Chinese engineers started work on an all weather road, the Karakorum highway, jointly. About 15,000, Chinese and Pakistanis took twenty years to build the 774 KM long highway through the 16,072 ft high mountains. The construction of the highway was worth the cost because it provided an all-weather, motor able link, boosted trade and created an important link between the two countries to be used in case of any emergency.²² This masterpiece has been rightly termed as the eighth wonder of the world.

The strategic importance of the Karakoran highway is obvious. It links Xinjiang with Tibet through the Aksai China. In case of an attack on Pakistan by sea, military aid from China can reach Pakistan through this route. The bridges on the Karakoram highway are capable of carrying lightweight tanks. To protect the highway from subversion, small military bases along the highway have been constructed. Its usefulness in time of peace and war is apparent²³

China has immensely aided in military and Pakistan's defence production without any pre-conditions, China provided military

assistance and technology after the 1965 Pak-India war, when United States had stopped Pakistan's aid. This military assistance comprised of small arms ammunition, tanks, anti-tank artillery and aircraft weapon systems. The greater help came in the establishment of defence and related industries in Pakistan; this included the Aeronautical Complex at Kamra, Pakistan Ordnance factories at Wah, Heavy Industries, Taxila. The collaboration between the two countries extends beyond military aid, which includes power plants at Guddu, Jamshoro and Ghazi Barotha, Saindak project in Baluchistan, space programme, mineral and water exploration in NWFP and Baluchistan and cooperation in ship building.

China's aid to Pakistan in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy has been critical in developing the later's capability. An agreement in this regard was signed on 15 September 1986. In 1991 a contract between Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and China's National Nuclear Corporation was signed for the construction of a reactor at Chasma. This reactor is meant for peaceful application of nuclear technology, personal training and supply of fuel. China at many times has assured critics that Chinese cooperation with Pakistan in nuclear power generation was strictly under supervision of UN's IAEA.²⁴ China is now the main supplier of arms and ammunition to Pakistan. A large percentage of Pakistan's tanks, bombers and fighter planes are of Chinese origin. Since the wars of 1965 and 1971, a regular arms flow is coming in from China to Pakistan.

Pakistan's own primary concerns are two fold namely security against the threat from India and economic development. Both are well served by maintaining and strengthening relations with China, the time demands that the exemplary friendship, which Pakistan and China have developed, should be nurtured and reinforced in the years to come.²⁵

China no longer needs Pakistan as a bridge to the US or Iran or Central Asian Republics. China has turned out to be a true and reliable friend of Pakistan. In all times and situations, China has always stood by, Pakistan. It is now a dire requirement for Pakistan to fully ally with China rather than looking towards other powers.

INDIAN OCEAN

In the south, Pakistan is bounded by about 450 miles of coast line of the Arabian sea stretching from the Rann of Kutch/Indian border to Iran in the West.²⁶ The Indian Ocean's coast line extends to the regions of West Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, Southern Africa and East Africa. A rather unusually large number of countries with different historical and cultural backgrounds and perspectives are involved, in varying degrees, in the Indian Ocean politics. The importance of the Indian Ocean lies in its richness and as lane of commerce and communication. The region contains 90% of the world's natural rubber, tin, jute and tea and abounds in cobalt, tungsten, copper, manganese ore, silver, sulphur and coal. Besides being the rice bowl of the world it contains about 50% of worlds oil reserves, 98% of the world's supply of diamonds, 60% of the uranium and 40% of the gold. Another of its assets is fish.²⁷

Due to its economic and geo-political importance, Indian Ocean has acquired a pivotal position in the world. Indian Ocean comprises of the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, extending more than 6,200 miles with an huge area of 28,40,000 square miles. To attain an influential role in the Indian Ocean, the Indians have immensely expanded and modernized its navy. During the 1971 war, India was successful in achieving its objectives through its strong and better navy. It is now a regional maritime power. As compared to India, Pakistan has a small navy still waiting to be equipped and modernized. Because of this Pakistan's capabilities in maritime defence are not satisfactory. India is far ahead in naval capacity leaving Pakistan threatened from its coastal line. Serious efforts shall have to be made to uplift Pakistan's Navy.

It was not until the late sixties that the Indian Ocean acquired salience in Pakistan's defence. This was due to the decision of British Government to gradually reduce its presence east of Suez, and desire of two super powers and a few littoral states to assume a dominant role in the region. US and USSR gradually increased their presence and competed with each other to bring more and more states in their orbit of influence.²⁸

The importance of Indian Ocean has grown even more after the Iranian revolution (1979) Afghanistan Crisis (1979 and 2001) and with the emergence of newly independent Central Asian Republics. With the much superior navy of India, Pakistan feels threatened along

with other littoral states of the region. Pakistan along with others has been demanding to declare Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

Conclusion

On account of its geographic situation, Pakistan is considered a part of the pivot area or the "Heartland", a word coined by the British geographer, Halford Mackinder. He said, who rules the "Heartland" commands the world. In the "Heartland", he included West China, Mongolia, Afghanistan and Iran.²⁹ While studying the defence policy of Pakistan, there are a number of geo-strategic and geo-political vulnerabilities of Pakistan. These are firstly, the lack of strategic depth. Looking at the shape of Pakistan from north to south Pakistan is an elongated strip of land and all its major cities lie close to its borders. Thus Pakistan lacks strategic depth which means Pakistan has insufficient space to organize defence in depth and due to this factor Pakistan becomes more vulnerable to India's pre-emptive strike, which can cut main lines of communication of Pakistan.

Secondly, there is also the lack of natural borders or frontiers especially at the most threatened eastern border with India. The borders of Kashmir and China are mountainous frontiers. Thirdly, India's large and modernized navy can during emergency isolate Pakistan from foreign support through a distant blockade. Especially during wartime Pakistan needs to have its sea route open for logistic support. To avert this blockade, Pakistan needs a bigger and better equipped navy.

Lastly, the most important vulnerability is the lack of internal dimension of security of Pakistan. Until and unless Pakistan is internally stable and strong, its external security concerns will be negatively affected by this. Pakistan at the moment is facing number of internal problems. Even after more than fifty years of independence Pakistan lacks political and economic stability due to this there has been regular intervention of military in politics. Pakistan remains a developing country with a weak economic infrastructure, huge foreign debts and reliance on foreign aid. This factor is a great hindrance in the development of Pakistan. Then there are ethno-linguistic and sectarian cleavages in various parts of Pakistan which are creating problems for the government and

creating disunity in the country. A number of social, economic factors have led to the deterioration of law and order situation.

To prevent India from its hegemonic designs it is necessary for Pakistan to maintain conventional and nuclear deterrence. To have a viable and effective defence policy, the policy makers have to stress upon economic uplift, political stability, futuristic foreign policy approach, increase in national power, and flexibility in policy with changing regional situations and produce a highly professional military. Given the magnitude of threat to Pakistan's security and her inadequate force level, it seems that Pakistan's security dilemma is certainly acute and complex. After studying the defence policy of Pakistan, over the years, it shows that Pakistan is adhering to a defensive rather than an offensive defence policy.

NOTES

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² *ibid.*, p-104.

³ Hasan, Ahsan Saeed. Jan. 1999. 'Pak-US Relations and Nawaz Sharif's Visit to Washington', in Current Affairs Digest, pp.96-97.

⁴ Rizvi, Mujtaba. 2001. 'Pakistan's Geopolitical Environment and Security', in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.). Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy, Karachi: Oxford Press, p.184.

⁵ Subramanian, R.R. 1990. India Pakistan China. Delhi: ABC Publishing House, p.25.

⁶ Sheikh, Javeed Ahmed. 1987. 'Security Perceptions of weak Nations', in Syed Farooq Hasnat and Auton Pelinka (eds), Security For the Weak Nations. Lahore: Izhar Sons, p.93.

⁷ Rizvi, op. cit., p.107.

⁸ Chaudri, Muhammad Ahsen. 1993. Pakistan and The Troubled World. Karachi: Royal Book, p.318.

⁹ *ibid.*, p.334.

¹⁰ Wirsing, Robert G. 2001. 'Pakistan Relations and the Problem of Kashmir', in Hafeez Malik (ed.). Pakistan, Founders Aspirations and Today's Realities. Karachi: Oxford Press, p.450.

¹¹ Khan, Zulfikar Ali. 1988. Pakistan's Security, The Challenge And The Response. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, p.30.

¹² Hussain, Mushahid. 1988. Pakistan And The Changing Regional Scenario. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, p.85.

¹³ Jalalzai, Musa Khan, 2002. Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Lahore: Khan Book, p.95.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.98.

¹⁵ Burke, S.M. 1973. Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis. Karachi: Oxford Press, p.68.

¹⁶ Rizvi, op. cit., p. 104.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p.105.

¹⁸ Jalalzai, op. cit., p.13.

¹⁹ Bhatti, Maqbool Ahmed. September 2000. 'Pak-China Relations in the 21st Century', in Current Affairs Digest, p.44.

²⁰ Rizvi, op. cit., p.104.

²¹ Chaudri, Mohammad Ahsen, 2001. 'Strategic and Military Dissensions in Pakistan-China Relations,' In Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.). Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy. Karachi: Oxford Press, p. 318.

²² *ibid.*, pp. 318-321.

²³ *ibid.* p.322.

²⁴ op. cit., p.172.

²⁵ Bhatti, op. cit., p. 58.

²⁶ Rizvi, op. cit., p.104.

²⁷ Hussain, Irtiza. 1989. Strategic Dimensions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, p.42.

²⁸ Rizvi, op. cit., p.104.

²⁹ Chaudri, op. cit., p. 322.

POLICY PAPERS

PAKISTAN'S POLICY ON IRAQ

Moonis Ahmar

Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan is constantly under a crisis situation. Beginning from the U.S. led war against terrorism to the attack on the Indian parliament and the subsequent threat of war with New Delhi in January and May 2002 to the recent onslaught on Iraq, Pakistan faced a paradoxical situation. By all estimate it was felt that had the Pakistan's Government supported the American resolution in the UN Security Council, it certainly would have faced a serious domestic backlash- but it never happened as the Resolution was not moved by the United States.

Pakistan's policy posture on the Iraqi situation needs to be examined in four important dimensions. First, the close Islamabad-Washington coordination on the war against terrorism since September 11, 2001. Second, the role of anti-American groups in Pakistan. Third, tense relations with India and finally Pakistan's stakes in seeking a political and peaceful outcome of Iraq-U.S. conflict.

As far as the question of Islamabad-Washington coordination or cooperation on the war against terrorism is concerned, one is aware of the fact that in the backdrop of tragic events of September 11, Pakistan was faced with a devil and deep blue sea situation. If it had turned down American pressure to join its side against the Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime in Kabul, the outcome would have been disastrous for Pakistan. Given the sensitivity of September 11 incidents and the allegations from various sides that Islamabad was involved in harboring Islamic extremist groups, remaining aloof from the U.S. led war against terrorism would have resulted into a direct

American action against Pakistan. This is the fact which Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf also narrated several times that by not supporting Washington, he would have endangered his country's survival, particularly its nuclear assets and its Kashmir policy. Therefore, Pakistan's policy posture in order to cope with the events

of September 11 covered its national interests in a best possible manner.

If viewed in the context of Iraq-U.S. crisis and the looming threat of American permanent pressures on Baghdad so as to evolve institutions as according to its requirements, Pakistan's predicament is that as an ally of Washington, it will be quite difficult to say no to the U.S. and renders its support of the overall long term American plans and intensions against that country. Even before the military action in Iraq, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage while talking to *Daily Dawn* agreed with the notion about Pakistan's predicament. According to him, "the United States understands that Pakistan faces a very complicated equation on Iraq and wants to resolve this conflict quickly to the benefit of Pakistan and other nations interested in the region."

But, the question is if Turkey and other pro-American countries, including some members of NATO like France and Germany can openly defy American policy over Iraq, why cannot Pakistan follow an independent line of action? That for how long, Pakistan will continue to toe the American line particularly when a sizeable portion of its public opinion rejects the U.S. policy over Iraq and wants a free and absolutely free Iraq. But in reality, Pakistan is neither Turkey nor like some non-conformist members of NATO. It presents as a weak state and highly vulnerable to American pressures. If the past also, in very few cases, Islamabad took a position contrary to the United States. It means that, even if the government of Pakistan disfavors American policy over Iraq, particularly the surrender of its sovereignty, it has its limitations and will have to reluctantly support the United States. Be as it may, Pakistan's policy posture over the Iraq-U.S. crisis is clearly linked with the ground realities, i.e. siding against Washington would mean a high risk situation which no government in Islamabad can afford to take.

This brings the debate on Pakistan policy options on the Iraq-U.S. crisis to another important area which is growing anti-Americanism in the country. One can cite the example of the holding of the so-called million men march in Karachi against American policies all over the world, particularly on Iraq. But, the fact is even before September 11, 2001, anti-American feelings had a strong constituency in Pakistan. Not only the Jehadi groups and various

other organizations having an anti-American bias, but even secular minded people in Pakistan, also condemned Washington for its double-standards, particularly in case of Israel-Palestine conflict and uprising in the Indian held Kashmir. In this scenario, the biggest dilemma for Islamabad is how it can stop the tide of anti-Americanism from reaching the corridors of power? Pakistani policy-makers are well aware of the fact that after September 11, any expression of anti-Americanism at the policy-making level would mean a subsequent backlash from Washington because of two reasons. First, America's veiled threat that it will take on the so-called terrorist groups allegedly supported by a part of Pakistani establishment. Second, it cannot guarantee the safety of its nuclear arsenal. President Musharraf in his speech which he delivered in the third week of September 2001 also made it clear that it was not possible for his country to confront the United States because such a policy would have endangered its Kashmir policy and also threatened the survival of its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, in order to protect its strategic interests Pakistan decided to side with America. Demonstrations against Pakistan joining the U.S. led war in Afghanistan were held and the wave of anti-Americanism touched new heights but soon Islamabad was able to suppress popular demonstrations. On this account, it will not be wrong to argue that even if Pakistan decides to support Washington's policy in Iraq, the chances of anti-Americanism taking a serious turn are slim. Pakistan is not like Iran where feelings against America were genuinely found at the time of revolution and the question of anti-Americanism in Pakistan is more or less related to the anger of so-called religious parties against Washington stopping its financial support to them after the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Pakistan's continuous cold war with India is also an important factor in determining its position on the Iraq-U.S. crisis. Since September 11, 2001, Indo-Pakistan relations have reached the lowest level because to a large extent, New Delhi tried to implicate Islamabad in the so-called support to Islamic terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Kashmir and in other parts of Asia. For Pakistan, India had played foul by taking advantage of America's war against Taliban and Al-Qaida and proving that terrorist groups were in fact getting support from the Pakistani establishment. For Islamabad, the crux of the Indian strategy after September 11 was to kill two birds with one stone: to liquidate Pakistan's support to the Kashmiri emancipation movement and at the same time to also push America declare Pakistan as a terrorist state. Against this background, Pakistan's

biggest fear is if it takes a neutral position on the Iraq-U.S. crisis and refuses to support America in its war against Iraq, India may take advantage of the situation and deepen its ties with Washington. It is because of this fear or preconceived notion held by the policy-makers of Pakistan that it cannot take a position contrary to America on the issue of Iraq. For this purpose, it will not be illogical to argue that till the time Indo-Pak relations reached the state of normalcy, Pakistan will not be in a position to offend the United States. What the Amir of *Jamaat-I-Islami*, Mr. Qazi Hussain Ahmed has said in his address at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad that in order to get rid of the slavery of America, Pakistan should think of normalizing relations with New Delhi needs to be closely analyzed. There exists a perception in Pakistan that its dependence on Washington has more to do with continuous Indo-Pak cold war. But the question is, how Pakistan can strive for normalizing relations with India minus the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, particularly when President General Pervez Musharraf in his interview given to an Indian Channel in Kuala Lumpur categorically stated that no government in Pakistan can survive if it compromises on Kashmir.

Pakistan's stakes for a viable settlement of the Iraq-U.S. crisis are many. First, Pakistan wouldn't like to be in an embarrassing position where it is compelled to support Washington on Iraq and at the same time also has to cope with domestic backlash. Second, the economic repercussions of the lingering U.S. presence in Iraq over Pakistan would be severe thus seriously endangering the policy of reforms unleashed by the Musharraf and then Jamali government. For Pakistan, a smooth sailing of the Iraq-U.S. crisis is also essential so that the people of Iraq are given full mandate to choose a regime of their liking. In February, Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali paid a week long visit to the Gulf countries so as to explain Pakistan's position on the Iraq-U.S. crisis, particularly Islamabad's consistent approach that the crisis needs to be managed through diplomatic and political means and not by the unwarranted use of force. Pakistan has also made it clear its stand before the NAM summit and in other international fora that any action against Iraq must be legitimate and should have the support of United Nations, including its Security Council. However, here the only thing is, Pakistan is not in a position to prevail over the Bush administration to follow a rational and pragmatic approach vis-à-vis Baghdad. Like other weak countries, it will have to take a position in such a manner that it is saved from losses, both in the short and in the long term.

The above discussion on the policy posture of Pakistan on the Iraq-U.S. crisis brings one to the next question: what will be the aftermath of Iraq-U.S. crisis and how should Pakistan handle such a situation? After observing the situation emanating from the Anglo-British posture on Iraq, it seems clear that both have decided to go ahead with their plans to disarm Baghdad and forcibly change the political and economic structures as well. The U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell had made it clear that any war with Iraq will be brief and short with minimum loss of human lives, but that did not happen. For how long American-allied forces will remain in Iraq is also not known. Washington is supposed to have decided that the post-war Iraq will be governed by its military commander but not for a long period of time. To a large extent the scenario in post-Saddam Iraq depends on the success of America in convincing the people that they would leave soon and also how the subsequent reaction of such an operation in the Arab/Muslim world is perceived. As far as Turkey is concerned, its parliament refused to grant permission to American forces use their territory for military operations against Iraq. The Arab League, in its summit held at Sharm-al-Sheikh decided to oppose the use of force against Iraq and has made it clear that an attack on any member of the League, would be considered as an attack on the Arab world.

Pakistan's paradoxical situation on the Iraq-U.S. crisis seems to depict some sort of confusion at the policy making level. With MMA in power in NWFP and mustering support at the popular level to condemn the American attack over Iraq, policy makers in Islamabad are in a fix. Should they go ahead with the traditional Pakistani style support to Washington or should they follow an independent line of action? In both cases, the risks are imminent. Since after the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, Parliament is supposedly the supreme decision making authority and the National Security Council is also a forum of some significance; it is better if both these bodies do some serious home work and formulate a policy for the country which could be in the true national interest. To a large extent, policy posture of Islamabad in the past depicted short term, instead of long term objectives. Now the time has come when the government, with the support of people, should disassociate itself from past blunders on foreign policy matters and pursue things which could at least match with the principles of rationality and prudence.

PAKISTAN ON IRAQ CRISIS – A BACKGROUND

Rana Eijaz Ahmed

Pakistan's reaction on Iraq crisis can be described as mild and careful as according to the new compulsions present in the global political scenario. The 9/11 gave Pakistan a status of a front line state against terrorism, and the Western world lauded Pakistan's efforts in war against terrorism. The question is that how does Pakistan can react appropriately over Iraq crisis? Answer can be given in Pakistan's domestic and international policy frameworks.

Pakistan's Domestic Policy Framework

Since October 2002, Parliament is somewhat functional and the democratic process is on the way to normalize- as a reaction world has started listening Pakistan's viewpoint over different issues of world politics. The students of politics know that capabilities of a political system play an important role in making the system prosperous and economically self-sufficient. Jean Blondel who highlights at least five observable capabilities, which provide a scale to measure the symptoms of decay or development in a political system. The five capabilities are: Extractive, Regulative, Distributive, Symbolic, and, Responsive. Extractive capability means that a political system should have the ability to extract its economic and natural resources at domestic and international levels. For example, collection of taxes at home and to bring more investment from abroad depicts that extractive capability is active. Regulative capability stands for the regulation of the resources extracted both at home and abroad. Whereas distributive capability denotes the equitable distribution of the resources in the society, obtained through extraction and regulation.

In the 'global village' environment this aspect of distribution of resources is more attractive for direct investments from abroad and the quantum of exports which indicate the effectiveness of distributive capability. Symbolic capability, likewise, exposes the integration of a state through symbols, monuments, slogans, words and

achievements. Whereas, responsive capability relates to the output function and demonstrates the system's response to the influx of demands coming from the public sector. This responsiveness is always subject to the first four capabilities. If those capabilities are utilized timely and effectively, the response to the in coming demands will be adequately positive. But since all the capabilities relate to the ever-changing domestic and global environments, they have their own implications making them variable.

In this context, we should keep in view the economic condition of Pakistan that is not commendable. At present poverty is on the rise, day by day, thereby the society cannot afford any kind of adverse reaction at the international level. Pakistan is a plural state where sub state actors are active going in the opposite directions of Pakistan's economy. The present government is a coalition government and an amalgam of conservative and liberal cliques. Therefore, in such unpredictable and uncertain situation at home, the government is compelled to respond towards the Iraq crisis in a manner so that not to distort Pakistan's image in international politics, as a balanced nation. It does not mean that if Pakistan supports the autonomy of Iraq it will be perceived against peace. It is also not necessary that Pakistan should support the United States' policy towards Iraq; rather our political elite have to opt such measures that could demonstrate Pakistan as a country which believes in equitable policies. China's example is pertinent and as the present situation demands, restrained from world crises as actively as it could; it always concentrates on its economic affairs that are why it has become a rising economic giant in the world.

It is worthy to note that Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali kept his consultations on the Iraq situation with different segments of the society at a low-key basis and is unlikely to engage in any kind of contentious deliberations. During the counseling process, the prime minister addressed the provincial cabinets in the presence of the chief ministers and governors and received a feedback on how Pakistan's stance on the Iraq crisis should be. He also held discussions with groups of federal and provincial legislators on the issue. Jamali also met top leaders of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and some other political parties to know their views and explain his government's policy on the Iraq scenario. The views of most of these political parties are well known. The MMA wanted the government to

censure and reject the US attack on Iraq and resist it as far as possible. The religious parties grouping also wanted Pakistan not to vote for the new US resolution in the UN Security Council.

Pakistan's International Policy Framework

After becoming a nuclear state in 1998, Pakistan's responsibilities increased enormously at domestic as well as international levels. Pakistan's nuclear programme is purely for peaceful purposes and focused on defense and security concerns. It is evident that Pakistan is not transferring its nuclear capabilities to any other country and abiding by all rules and regulations of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agenda. Pakistan is fully aware of its nuclear safeguards and stick to its stand on using its nuclear capability for defensive purposes. During the height of the Iraq crisis Pakistan took a reasonable stance on the expected US Resolution of the Security Council. Premier Jamali made it clear at that moment that Pakistan would follow the Security Council resolution on Iraq, and pledged not to do anything contrary to the security of Pakistan. Pakistan's vote as a non-permanent member of the Security Council was crucial for the proposed US sponsored resolution, paving the way for an attack on Iraq. It became all the more important when a predominant majority of the permanent and non-permanent members of the world body resolved to go against any resolution supporting war.

In the ongoing developments Washington put pressures on Islamabad to be "on board", if it was already not there. However, President General Pervez reacted while addressing to President George W Bush, during a telephonic talk that "war is not a good option".

France, which is among the five permanent members of the Security Council, has over and over again made it public that it would veto the new resolution. The Russian foreign minister declared that his country would not support such a resolution. China, another permanent member, also opposed to attack on Iraq. Britain is the only ally of the United States while among the non-permanent members, only Spain supported the militant US policy against Baghdad.

Conclusion

Every country participates in world affairs according to its capability. Mostly industrialized and technologically advanced countries have more impact in world politics. Pakistan is a country that is under constant pressure in the world politics, especially after detonating its nuclear devices, so it becomes the responsibility of high echelons of the government to design their attitude towards the world politics in post-US-Iraq war, after taking all the domestic as well as regional factors into consideration.

CHALLENGES FOR NEW LEADERSHIP IN CHINA

Muhammad Ijaz Butt

China prepares to complete its biggest shuffle of top Communist Party and government posts since the 1970s. The Party's general secretary, 77 years old Jiang Zemin has stepped down and replaced by China's Vice President Hu Jintao, who is 60. The all powerful Politburo Standing Committee will see most of its members retired by the mid of this year. In addition, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and the leader of the National People's Congress Li Peng has also left their offices in mid March, 2003 and replaced by Wen Jiabao 60 and Wu Bangguo 61 accordingly.¹ The majority of new faces are technocrats, having provincial experience of Party Chiefs but carry little national clout. It can not be expected for an immediate policy change by the new leadership as Jiang will continue to be country's paramount figure even after his retirement. A truly dominant new leader may not emerge in Beijing for another three to five years.²

China is assumed to be an economic giant of 21st century but beneath this image of progress and prosperity lays a different reality. The new Chinese leadership will face a hidden, crisis of governance which is aggravating day by day in different spheres of life. The future of China, and the West's investments, depends critically on how Beijing's new leaders deal with this somber reality. China's current crisis results from fundamental contradictions in the reforms that it has pursued over the past two decades.

The incompatibilities between China's current political system and the essential requirements of the rule of law, a market economy and an open society have not been washed away by waves of foreign investment. Though China's pragmatic leaders have made a series of tactical adjustments to weather many new socio-economic challenges, such as the Communist Party's recent outreach to entrepreneurs but these moves are no substitute for genuine institutional reforms that would reinvigorate and re-legitimize the ruling party.³

In most political systems, a regime's capacity to govern is measured by how it performs three key tasks: mobilizing political support, providing public goods, and managing internal tensions. These three functions of governance legitimation, performance and conflict resolution are in reality, intertwined. A regime capable of providing adequate public goods (education, public health, law and order) is more likely to gain popular support and keep internal tensions low. In a Communist Party, State, however, effective largely depends on the health of the ruling party. Strong organizational discipline, accountability and set of core values with broad appeal are essential to effectively governance. Deterioration of the ruling party's strength, on the other hand, sets in motion a downward cycle that can severely impair the party - state's capacity to govern.⁴

The decline of Chinese Communist Party began during the rule of Mao Zedong as his Cultural Revolution (1966-76) deeply damaged the ruling party. The ascend of Deng Xiaoping and his progressive reforms slowed this process, as economic gains, the end of mass-repression and the expansion of personal freedoms partially repaired the Communist Party's tarnished image. But Deng's pro-market reforms produced a different set of dynamics that began to destroy the Communist Party's support. As economic reforms deepened, large segments of Chinese society became poorer. The revenue-starved state was unable to compensate these losers from reform. Consequently, the Communist Party had little means to secure the political support of these disaffected groups beyond exhorting self-sacrifice and making empty promises of better times ahead. Some members of the ruling elite also converted their political power into economic gains, building and profiting from patronage machines. In one survey, about two-thirds of the officials being trained at a municipal party school said their promotion depended solely on the favors of their superiors, only 5% thought their own efforts, could advance their careers. A ruling party fractured from within by such personalized patronage system is hardly capable of building broad-based support within society. Thus the Chinese Communist Party no longer possesses the political appeal or the organizational capacity required to launch a mass political campaign (a previous hallmark of its ability) even when it desires them (as was the case during Beijing's efforts to contain pro-

democracy dissidents in the late 1980s and the Falun Gong spiritual movement in the late 1990s.⁵

When faced with direct challenges to its authority, the Chinese Communist Party can rely only on repression rather than public mobilization to counter its opponents. The extent of the Communist Party's decline can be measured in three areas, the shrinkage of its organizational penetration, the erosion of its authority and appeal among the masses, and the break down of its internal discipline. Historically, a Communist Party has thrived only in economics dominated by the state. The new economic infrastructure based on household farming rather rural communes, private business, and individual labor mobility is inhospitable to a large party apparatus. For instance, an internal Chinese Communist Party report characterized half of the party's rural cells as "weak" or paralyzed in recent years. In urban areas, Communist Party has been unable to penetrate in the emerging private sector, while its old organizational base has collapsed.

In 2000-2001, the Chinese Communist Party did not have a single member in 86 percent of the country's 1.5 million private firms and could establish cells in only one percent of private companies. Its organizational decay is paralleled by the decline of its authority and image among the public. A survey of 1000 migrant laborers in Beijing in 1998-99 revealed that the prevailing image of the ruling party was that of self-serving elite; use their power only for private gains. Other surveys have revealed similar negative public perceptions of the Chinese Communist Party. At the same time as public officials are losing respect, the party's ideological appeal has all but evaporated. Polls conducted by the official national trade union in 1998 showed that only 15% of the workers surveyed regarded communisms as their highest ideal while 70 percent said that their top priority was to pursue individual happiness.⁶

At the heart of the Chinese Communist Party's organizational and reputational decline is the breakdown of its members, ideological beliefs and internal discipline; cynicism and corruption abound. The sale of government offices by local Chinese Communist Party bosses was unheard of in the 1980's but became widespread in the 1990s. Such practices were continuing unabated. Even more worrying, the Communist Party

appears unable to enforce internal discipline despite the mortal threat posed by corruption which has surpassed unemployment as the most serious cause of social instability. Recent official actions, especially the prosecution and execution of several senior officials, create the impression that the Chinese Communist Party leadership is committed to combating corruption but ground realities are entirely different as most corrupt officials caught seem to have gotten off with no more than a slap on the wrist. Perhaps the greatest contributing factor to the party's political decline is the absence of competition. Competition would have forced the party to redefine its mission and recruit members with genuine public appeal. In a party state, the ruling party's weakness destroys gradually the state's power. Such 'state incapacitation' which in its extreme form results in failed states, is exemplified by the government's increasing inability to provide essential services, such as public safety, education, basic health care, environmental protection and law enforcement. In China, this situation is alarming. Take, for example, the number of traffic fatalities (a key measure of state's capacity to regulate a routine but vital social activity, transportation) Chinese road are almost twice as deadly today as they were in 1985.⁷ There were about 58 road fatalities per thousand vehicles in 2001, compared to 34 in 1985. Although China has made tremendous progress in improving education, its recent performance lags behind that of many developing countries. China's education spending in 1999 was a mere 2.6 percent of G.D.P., below the average of 3.4 percent for low income countries.⁸

In fact, China spends almost a third less on education than does India. As a result, access to primary and intermediate education is as low as 40 percent among school China's health system ranked 144th worldwide, placing it behind India, Indonesia and Bangladesh.⁹

China's agricultural population has been hit especially hard, as government neglect has led to a near total collapse of the rural public health infrastructure. According to the 1999 survey conducted by the Ministry of Health, 37 percent of ill farmers did not seek medical treatment because they could not afford it, and 65 percent of sick peasants needing hospitalization were not admitted because they could not pay. Poor health has become the chief cause of poverty in rural China; even more troubling, the

crumbling public health infrastructure is a principal cause of the rapid spread of HIV and Aids in China.

The UN warned in a recent study that "China is on the verge of a catastrophe that could result in unimaginable human suffering, economic loss, and social devastation." State incapacitation also manifests itself in worsening environmental degradation. This problem poses perhaps the deadliest threat to China's continued economic development. About a third of the country suffers from severe soil erosion, 80 percent of wastewater is discharged untreated, 75 percent of the country's lakes and about half its rivers have been polluted, and nine of the ten cities with the worst air pollution in the world in 2000 were located in China. China suffers huge direct economic losses from this environmental damage. The World Bank estimated in the mid 1990s that major forms of pollution cost to country 7.7 percent of its G.D.P.¹⁰

The central cause of the declining effectiveness of the Chinese State is a dysfunctional fiscal system that has severely undercut the government's ability to fund public services which creating ample opportunities for corruption. Government data misleading suggest that the State experienced a massive loss of revenue over the last two decades, as its tax receipts fell from 31 percent of G.D.P. in 1978 to 14 percent in 2000. The truth, however, is quite different. Aggregate government revenue over the past 20 years has held steady at about 30 percent of G.D.P. what has changed is the massive diversion of revenue from the government budget, increasingly; income collected by government is not listed in the official budget. Such off-budget earning exceeded budgeted tax revenue by two to one.

Provincial and municipal governments are the primary beneficiaries of this system because it allows them to raise revenue outside the normal tax streams. Because local officials are more likely to get promoted for delivering short-term growth or other such tangible results, off budget revenue tends to be spent on building local industries and other projects that do little to improve education, health or the environment. Moreover, since normal budget rules do not apply to such revenue, official enjoy near total discretion over its spending. Consequently, corruption is widespread. Large portions of this off budget money have been

found stashed away in secret slush funds, controlled by government officials.¹¹

The state's declining fiscal health created serious problem in particular rural agrarian provinces where it generated large scale peasant rebellion in the past. A workable solution will require reforming the flawed fiscal system at the top and restructuring local governments at the bottom to make them more efficient and responsive. The institutional decline of the ruling party and the weakness of the state have caused rising tensions between the state and the society. The number of protests, riots and other forms of resistance against state authorities has risen sharply. In March 2002, more than 20000 laid off workers participated in a weeklong protest in the northern city of Liaoyang. In rural areas, many towns have reported mob attacks by peasants on government buildings and even on officials themselves. To be sure, rising social frustration results partly from hardships produced by China's economic transition.¹²

In recent years, falling income in rural areas and growing unemployment in the cities have contributed to the rising discontent among tens of millions of peasants and workers. But the increasing frequency, scale and intensity of collective defiance and individual resistance also reveal deep flaws in Chinese political institutions that have exacerbated the strains of transition. Social frustration is translated into political protest not merely because of economic deprivation, but because of a growing sense of political injustice.

Government officials who abuse their power and perpetrate acts of petty despotism create resentment among ordinary citizens everyday. These private grievances are more likely to find violent expression when the institutional mechanism for resolving them (such as the courts, the press, and govt. bureaucracies) is inaccessible unresponsive, and inadequate.¹³

Relations between the state and society are growing more tense at a time of rising income inequality. The most important cause of overall inequality are the growing rural-urban income gap and regional disputes, the level of income inequality within regions and cities has been rising at an alarming pace as well. Recent

surveys have found that inequality has become one of the top three concerns for the public.

In the context of rampant official corruption, this rising inequality is likely to fuel public ire against the government because most people believe that only the corrupt and privileged can accumulate wealth. The Communist Party failure to open up the political system and expand institutional channels for conflict resolution creates an environment in which aggrieved groups turn to collective protest to express frustration and seek redress. The accumulation of state society tensions will eventually destabilize China, especially because the dynamics that revolution.¹⁴

Remedying China's mounting governance deficits should be the top priority of the country's new leaders. If the new leadership addresses the institutional sources of poor governance, the Communist Party of China may be able to manage its problems without risking a political upheaval. China without restructuring its political system can never gain the institutional competence required to generate power and prosperity on a sustainable basis.

The poor governance makes trade and investment more costly and more risky and if goes unchanged, the current economic dynamism may soon fade as long term stagnation sets in.

NOTES

- ¹ The National (Daily) Lahore, March 16, 2003.
- ² Khaleej Times, March 16, 2003.
- ³ Gulf News, March 16, 2003.
- ⁴ The Economist.com "China- New Rulers – The Path to Power", The New York Review of Books, September 26, 2002. pp. 101-103.
- ⁵ Ibid.

- ⁶ Andrew J. Nathan, "China's New Rulers – The Path to Power", op. cit.
- ⁷ Ibid., p. 237.
- ⁸ The Economist (London), 25th – 31st January, 2003, pp. 29-30.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ The Economist, 22nd – 28th February, 2003, p. 30.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² The Economist, 1st – 7th February, 2003, p. 30.
- ¹³ Bruce Gilley, "The Implication of China's Leadership Succession for the US", A submission to the US-China Society Review Commission, September 23, 2003.
- ¹⁴ Andrew J. Nathan, and Bruce Gilley, *China's Transition*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 313.

BOOK REVIEW

**BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS; Published for the
World Bank by Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 249**

Mubeen Irshad

"Building Institutions for Markets" is a World Development Report; about market institutions that promote growth and reduce poverty, addressing how institutions support markets, what makes institutions work, and how to build them? This Report is a continuation of World Development Report 2000/2001, which discusses the central role of markets in the lives of poor people, while the latest edition defines institutions as rules, enforcement mechanisms, and organizations and mentions that individuals and communities, local entrepreneurs, multinational companies, and multilateral organizations can build institutions, often in partnership with each other. National government may initiate reform or may simply respond to pressures from the private sector or from external actors. The four lessons this report offers for building institutions are:

1. Design new institutions to complement what exists in terms of human capabilities and technologies;
2. Innovate to identify institutions that work and those that do not;
3. Work to connect communities through open information flows and open trade;
4. Promote competition;

The first two lessons are about supplying effective market supporting institutions. But supplying institutions is not enough. People must want to use them too. And the second two are also to create the demand for such institutions and about the forces for change within countries.

The reviewed World Bank report provides a framework for evaluating the role of institutions in supporting market transactions, growth, and poverty reduction.

This useful publication concentrates on firms and addresses institutional issues that affect productivity and risk management in agriculture: the rights to land, the credit in rural areas, and the institutions that support innovation and dissemination of ideas in agriculture. Access to markets, local or global, is an important factor affecting demand for further change in domestic markets. It highlights the problems of governance for firms, looking at institutions, internal and external to the firm that enhance investment in firms and ensure good management especially the interaction between ownership structures and legal frameworks and between private institutions and public ones. It argues that openness to trade in goods and services and to information sharing can increase the efficiency of such private mechanisms and can increase the efficiency of such private mechanisms and can promote further institution building by creating forces for change. Formal government institutions can offer long term benefits to complement private initiatives and increases opportunity for firms. Report explores the critical role of the supervisory and regulatory systems. New research done on the role of politics in financial development, institutions to secure access for new borrowers and the effects of foreign bank entry and privatization.

The report under review pays a special attention on the functions of a government. It examines how political institutions support good governance, focusing on the policymaking process, the incentives for corruption, and the institutions of taxation. The ability of the state to provide those institutions that support growth and poverty reduction often referred to as good governance is essential to development. Countries that have failed in this respect have seen stagnate and poverty persist. There is no blueprint for change Institutions to support good governance. Political and social forces can push countries in diverse directions. It next explores issues of judicial efficiency, and the experience with reforms aimed at improving efficiency, and examines the causes and consequences of cross country differences in judicial procedures from a new survey covering over 100 countries. Judicial reform that aims to improve the quality and integrity of judicial decision is best focused on creating politically independent, difficult to intimidate judges. Creating a system of checks and balances. Judicial independence a system of social accountability and channels used for it can be free media and civil society organizations or accountability can be built into the judicial system itself. It then explains the main impediments to competition in markets, gathering new data on business entry

regulations around the world and on competition authorities and legislation. With more international competition and trade, and greater access to industrial country markets and technology, poor countries have a better chance at developing their markets. Competition is an important force in promoting institutional change as well as economic development and growth. It then assesses the regulation of monopolies in developing countries and the consequences for service delivery to poor people. Infrastructure services are critical to the operation and efficiency of a modern economy. Improvements in infrastructure services are required.

Report next concentrates on society. Societal forces shape the effectiveness, growth, and legitimacy of market institutions, which in turn affect the rules and values of societal actors. It explores how norms and codes of conduct in societies influence markets and public institutions and in turn are influenced by market developments. Formal and Informal institutions supported the market activities. Formal institutions are important because they can deal with a larger group of participants and because, if well designed, they can serve to include more people rather than exclude them. Lastly the Report explores the role of the media in expressing and disseminating the concerns and values of society. Information flows have effects on institutional quality and thus on economic and social outcomes.

A project for this Report gathered new evidence on the ownership structures of the largest five newspapers and five television stations in each of 97 countries. It found state ownership to be pervasive. On average, the state controls about 30% of the top five newspapers and 60% of the top five television stations in these countries. The state owns a huge share, 72% of the largest radio stations. Moreover private ownership is mostly in family hands rather than in widely dispersed shareholdings. Some privately held media are also closely related to the state, through business, family, and personal associations. So, the influence of state control is even greater and state ownership also varies significantly by region.

The role of media is tackled - like why is state ownership much more prevalent in television than in the press? Perhaps because television has higher fixed costs and greater economies of scale. To reduce state control of media ownership, countries have established independent state media organizations, new institutional structures that provide checks and balances. British Broadcasting

Corporation (BBC) is state owned, and its board of governors, appointed by government officials, is accountable to the government. But its charter establishes it as an independent corporation. Explicitly guarantee in the charter and accompanying agreement is freedom from government interference in the content and timing of its broadcasts and in the management of its internal affairs.

The most effective point of this Report is that it offers policymakers some guidelines that has been distilled both from the history of institutional evolution and from the lessons of recent experience. The analysis of this World Bank Report backed with numerous tables, comprehensive and original data and figures helps the reader to have an understanding for building institutions for markets. At the same time, the Report does not address all possible institutional problems in all possible fields. Rather, it focuses on a subset of these institutions from many fields to illustrate that the framework (inform, enforce, compete) and messages (complement, innovate, connect) can be applied regardless of the specific sector studied. Building effective institutions is a complex task. Experience indicates that one size does not fit all but notwithstanding the uniqueness of countries; analysis of country experience does hold important lessons for institutional development. Report acknowledges as well that many reforms are difficult because there are constituencies which benefit from existing institutions and often interest groups, who would promote change, but do not respond positively.

Local, national, international actors, public or private, affect how institutions evolve over time. The balance of power between private and public actors, and the states recognition of both strengths and limitations, is an important factor in market development. The strong and capable state is necessary to support markets, and an arbitrary and corrupt state can impede their development. But is not only the balance between private and public actors that matters. The design of institutions and the pace of reform are affected by how local and national leaders and national and international leaders interact. All of these interactions are affected by the nature of information flows and the capabilities of the various parties. And people are affected by what other market actors do.

Report also highlights the importance of human capital needed, the extent of corruption, and costs relative to per capita income. With

scarce human capital, complex regulations can not be enforced as they are in countries with highly skilled personnel. These factors argue for simplification of institutional design. Higher costs relative to per capita income of accessing formal institutions will mean that disadvantaged and the poorer members of the society will be unable to access these institutions. Corruption is facilitated by complexity of regulation in non transparent markets and where other incentives for bureaucratic efficiency (such as wages or promotion) are weak.

Finally this World Bank Report suggests that providing opportunities for trade will develop markets and the demand for institutions that support transactions in markets. Open information sharing will do the same. Competition among regions and among firms, often limited by current institutional forms and create the demand for new institutions.

This Report is a recommended reading for those who wish to obtain a better understanding of the institutional support to markets and a step towards poverty reduction, growth and formation of different institutions in the world.

DOCUMENTS

Statement by Hans Blix to the UN Security Council - Security Council - Global Policy Forum

The governing security council resolutions The resolution adopted by the security council on Iraq in November last year asks Unmovic and the IAEA to "update" the Council 60 days after the resumption of inspections. This is today. The updating, it seems, forms part of an assessment by the Council and its Members of the results, so far, of the inspections and of their role as a means to achieve verifiable disarmament in Iraq.

As this is an open meeting of the Council, it may be appropriate briefly to provide some background for a better understanding of where we stand today. With your permission, I shall do so. I begin by recalling that inspections as a part of a disarmament process in Iraq started in 1991, immediately after the Gulf War. They went on for eight years until December 1998, when inspectors were withdrawn. Thereafter, for nearly four years there were no inspections. They were resumed only at the end of November last year.

While the fundamental aim of inspections in Iraq has always been to verify disarmament, the successive resolutions adopted by the Council over the years have varied somewhat in emphasis and approach.

In 1991, resolution 687 (1991), adopted unanimously as a part of the cease-fire after the Gulf War, had five major elements. The three first related to disarmament. They called for :

- declarations by Iraq of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles;
- verification of the declarations through Unscm and the IAEA; supervision by these organizations of the destruction or the elimination of proscribed programmes and items.

After the Completion of the Disarmament :

- the Council would have authority to proceed to a lifting of the sanctions

(economic restrictions); and

- the inspecting organizations would move to long-term ongoing monitoring and verification.

Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required cooperation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not even today - of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.

As we know, the twin operation 'declare and verify', which was prescribed in resolution 687 (1991), too often turned into a game of 'hide and seek'. Rather than just verifying declarations and supporting evidence, the two inspecting organizations found themselves engaged in efforts to map the weapons programmes and to search for evidence through inspections, interviews, seminars, inquiries with suppliers and intelligence organizations. As a result, the disarmament phase was not completed in the short time expected. Sanctions remained and took a severe toll until Iraq accepted the Oil for Food Programme and the gradual development of that programme mitigated the effects of the sanctions.

The implementation of resolution 687 (1991) nevertheless brought about considerable disarmament results. It has been recognized that more weapons of mass destruction were destroyed under this resolution than were destroyed during the Gulf War: large quantities of chemical weapons were destroyed under Unscocom supervision before 1994. While Iraq claims - with little evidence - that it destroyed all biological weapons unilaterally in 1991, it is certain that Unscocom destroyed large biological weapons production facilities in 1996. The large nuclear infrastructure was destroyed and the fissionable material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA.

One of three important questions before us today is how much might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991; and, possibly, thereafter; the second question is what, if anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when the inspectors left; and the third question is how it can be prevented that any weapons

of mass destruction be produced or procured in the future. In December 1999 - after one year without inspections in Iraq - resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted by the Council with 4 abstentions. Supplementing the basic resolutions of 1991 and following years, it provided Iraq with a somewhat less ambitious approach: in return for "cooperation in all respects" for a specified period of time, including progress in the resolution of "key remaining disarmament tasks", it opened the possibility, not for the lifting, but the suspension of sanctions.

For nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any inspections by Unmovic. It was only after appeals by the Secretary-General and Arab States and pressure by the United States and other Member States, that Iraq declared on 16 September last year that it would again accept inspections without conditions.

Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted on 8 November last year and emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate. It required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active. The resolution contained many provisions, which we welcome as enhancing and strengthening the inspection regime. The unanimity by which it was adopted sent a powerful signal that the Council was of one mind in creating a last opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection.

Unmovic shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under the resolutions I have cited, it would be followed by monitoring for such time as the Council feels would be required. The resolutions also point to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate goal. As a subsidiary body of the Council, Unmovic is fully aware of and appreciates the close attention, which the Council devotes to the inspections in Iraq.

While today's "updating" is foreseen in resolution 1441 (2002), the Council can and does call for additional briefings whenever it wishes. One was held on 19 January and a further such briefing is tentatively set for 14 February. I turn now to the key requirement of cooperation and Iraq's response to it. Cooperation might be said to relate to both substance and process. It would appear from our experience so far that Iraq has decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, notably access. A similar decision

is indispensable to provide cooperation on substance in order to bring the disarmament task to completion through the peaceful process of inspection and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course. An initial minor step would be to adopt the long-overdue legislation required by the resolutions. I shall deal first with cooperation on process.

Cooperation on Process

It has regard to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and practical arrangements to pursue inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While inspection is not built on the premise of confidence but may lead to confidence if it is successful, there must nevertheless be a measure of mutual confidence from the very beginning in running the operation of inspection. Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with Unmovic in this field. The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt. We have further had great help in building up the infrastructure of our office in Baghdad and the field office in Mosul. Arrangements and services for our plane and our helicopters have been good. The environment has been workable. Our inspections have included universities, military bases, presidential sites and private residences. Inspections have also taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on Christmas day and New Years day. These inspections have been conducted in the same manner as all other inspections. We seek to be both effective and correct.

In this updating I am bound, however, to register some problems. Firstly, relating to two kinds of air operations.

While we now have the technical capability to send a U-2 plane placed at our disposal for aerial imagery and for surveillance during inspections and have informed Iraq that we planned to do so, Iraq has refused to guarantee its safety, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled. As these conditions went beyond what is stipulated in resolution 1441 (2002) and what was practiced by Unscm and Iraq in the past, we note that Iraq is not so far complying with our request. I hope this attitude will change.

Another air operation problem - which was solved during our recent talks in Baghdad - concerned the use of helicopters flying into

the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted on sending helicopters of their own to accompany ours. This would have raised a safety problem. The matter was solved by an offer on our part to take the accompanying Iraq minders in our helicopters to the sites, an arrangement that had been practiced by Unscm in the past.

I am obliged to note some recent disturbing incidents and harassment. For instance, for some time farfetched allegations have been made publicly that questions posed by inspectors were of intelligence character. While I might not defend every question that inspectors might have asked, Iraq knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes and Iraq should not say so. On a number of occasions, demonstrations have taken place in front of our offices and at inspection sites. The other day, a sightseeing excursion by five inspectors to a mosque was followed by an unwarranted public outburst. The inspectors went without any UN insignia and were welcomed in the kind manner that is characteristic of the normal Iraqi attitude to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were taken around. They asked perfectly innocent questions and parted with the invitation to come again.

Shortly thereafter, we receive protests from the Iraqi authorities about an unannounced inspection and about questions not relevant to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they were not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from the authorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may be for these events. They do not facilitate an already difficult job, in which we try to be effective, professional and, at the same time, correct. Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they can take it up in a calmer and less unpleasant manner.

Cooperation on Substance

The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains. Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can". Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of creating confidence. It

is not built upon the premise of trust. Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if there is both openness to the inspectors and action to present them with items to destroy or credible evidence about the absence of any such items.

The Declaration of 7 December

On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002) and within the time stipulated by the security council. In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome.

One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with from the Unscm document S/1999/94 of January 1999 and the so-called Amorim Report of March 1999 (S/1999/356). These are questions which Unmovic, governments and independent commentators have often cited.

While Unmovic has been preparing its own list of current "unresolved disarmament issues" and "key remaining disarmament tasks" in response to requirements in resolution 1284 (1999), we find the issues listed in the two reports as unresolved, professionally justified. These reports do not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.

They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside as evil machinations of Unscm. Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq's letter sent in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to the President of the security council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of these issues.

I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that need to be answered and I turn first to the sector of chemical weapons.

Chemical Weapons

The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

Unmovic, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.

There are also indications that the agent was weaponised. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.

I would now like to turn to the so-called "Air Force document" that I have discussed with the Council before. This document was originally found by an Unscm inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to Unmovic.

The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs.

The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.

The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.

The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found a further 4 chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji.

I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor. Whilst I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I reported on 19 December 2002, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq has declared that it had repaired chemical processing equipment previously destroyed under Unscm supervision, and had installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols. We have inspected this equipment and are conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. On completion, we will decide whether this and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed.

Biological Weapons

I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it as it is an important one.

Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction.

There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under Unmovic supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.

As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered.

In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council, Iraq's Foreign Minister stated that "all imported quantities of growth media were declared". This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax.

Missiles

I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s. Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or data on the consumption of the missiles.

There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions.

Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km,

with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development.

The Al Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of Unscorm directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of Unscorm to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles.

During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km. These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles.

In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under Unscorm supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 km.

Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2. Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.

Mr. President, I have touched upon some of the disarmament issues that remain open and that need to be answered if dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise. Which are the means at the disposal of Iraq to answer these questions? I have pointed to some during my presentation of the issues. Let me be a little more systematic. Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no proscribed items and if no evidence is presented to the contrary they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent. Unmovic, for its part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq, but nor is it - or I think anyone else after the inspections between 1991 and 1998 - presuming the opposite, that no such items and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem. Evidence and full transparency may help. Let me be specific.

Find the Items and Activities

Information provided by Member States tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall certainly follow up any credible leads given to us and report what we might find as well as any denial of access. So far we have reported on the recent find of a small number of empty 122 mm warheads for chemical weapons. Iraq declared that it appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more. Fine. Why not extend the search to other items? Declare what may be found and destroy it under our supervision?

Find Documents

When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more evidence, we have all too often met the response that there are no more documents. All existing relevant documents have been presented, we are told. All documents relating to the biological weapons programme were destroyed together with the weapons. However, Iraq has all the archives of the Government and its various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should have budgetary documents, requests for funds and reports on how they have been used. It should also have letters of credit and bills of lading, reports on production and losses of material.

In response to a recent Unmovic request for a number of specific documents, the only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of 193 pages which Iraq stated included all imports from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific Importation Division, the importing authority for the biological weapons programme. Potentially, it might help to clear some open issues. The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of documents, much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium support a concern that has long existed that documents might be distributed to the homes of private individuals. This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their work places. On our side, we cannot help but I think that the case might not be isolated and that such placements of documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents by placing them in private homes.

Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to accept access also to private sites. There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or documents. A denial of prompt access to any site would be a very serious matter. Find persons to give credible information: a list of personnel When Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of documents is not available, it ought at least to find individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify about their experience. Large weapons programmes are moved and managed by people. Interviews with individuals who may have worked in programmes in the past may fill blank spots in our knowledge and understanding. It could also be useful to learn that they are now employed in peaceful sectors. These were the reasons why Unmovic asked for a list of such persons, in accordance with resolution 1441. Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes as well as their missile programmes were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of people associated with those past weapons programmes that Unmovic either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other sources. At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing the list and some 80 additional names have been provided. Allow information through credible interviews.

In the past, much valuable information came from interviews. There were also cases in which the interviewee was clearly intimidated by the presence of and interruption by Iraqi officials. This was the background of resolution 1441's provision for a right for Unmovic and the IAEA to hold private interviews "in the mode or location" of our choice, in Baghdad or even abroad. To date, 11 individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad by us. The replies have invariably been that the individual will only speak at Iraq's monitoring directorate or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have evidence that they have not said anything that the authorities did not wish them to say. At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encourage persons to accept interviews "in private", that is to say alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not changed. However, we hope that with further encouragement from the authorities, knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews, in Baghdad or abroad.

Unmovic's Capability

Mr President, I must not conclude this "update" without some notes on the growing capability of Unmovic. In the past two months, Unmovic has built-up its capabilities in Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members from 60 countries. This includes approximately 100 Unmovic inspectors, 60 air operations staff, as well as security personnel, communications, translation and interpretation staff, medical support, and other services at our Baghdad office and Mosul field office. All serve the United Nations and report to no one else. Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow as our training programme continues - even at this moment we have a training course in session in Vienna. At the end of that course, we shall have a roster of about 350 qualified experts from which to draw inspectors.

A team supplied by the Swiss Government is refurbishing our offices in Baghdad, which had been empty for four years. The Government of New Zealand has contributed both a medical team and a communications team. The German Government will contribute unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and a group of specialists to operate them for us within Iraq. The Government of Cyprus has kindly allowed us to set up a Field Office in Lamaca. All these contributions have been of assistance in quickly starting up

our inspections and enhancing our capabilities. So has help from the UN in New York and from sister organizations in Baghdad.

In the past two months during which we have built-up our presence in Iraq, we have conducted about 300 inspections to more than 230 different sites. Of these, more than 20 were sites that had not been inspected before. By the end of December, Unmovic began using helicopters both for the transport of inspectors and for actual inspection work. We now have eight helicopters. They have already proved invaluable in helping to "freeze" large sites by observing the movement of traffic in and around the area.

Setting up a field office in Mosul has facilitated rapid inspections of sites in northern Iraq. We plan to establish soon a second field office in the Basra area, here we have already inspected a number of sites.

Mr. President, We have now an inspection apparatus that permits us to send multiple inspection teams every day all over Iraq, by road or by air. Let me end by simply noting that that capability which has been built-up in a short time and which is now operating, is at the disposal of the security council.

January 27, 2003

COMMUNIQUE ON IRAQ AND DECLARATION ON PALESTINE OF THE SECOND EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE

**DOHA, STATE OF QATAR
2 MUHARRAM 1424H (5 MARCH 2003)**

COMMUNIQUE OF THE SECOND EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON IRAQ

DECLARATION OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON THE GRAVE CONDITIONS IN PALESTINE.

Their Majesties, Excellencies, and Highnesses the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) convened the Second Session of their Islamic Summit Conference in the City of Doha, State of Qatar, on Wednesday 2 Muharram 1424H (5 March 2003), upon the invitation of His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar and Chairman of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference, and following contacts and consultations made by His Highness with a number of his brothers the Heads of State and Government of the Member States.

The Conference considered the general situation in the light of the tensions and successive developments and challenges presently faced by the Islamic Ummah as well as the threats of a possible military attack on Iraq and the conditions which the Palestinian cause is going through.

After reviewing the developments and circumstances surrounding these regional and international issues and the efforts being exerted by several players to contain the crisis through a peaceful resolution, particularly within the scope of the UN Security Council, the Conference adopted the following Communiqué and Declaration:

COMMUNIQUE OF THE SECOND EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON IRAQ

- The Second Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference was convened in Doha, State of Qatar, on 2 Muharram 1424H (5 March 2003).
- The Conference considered the grave situation generated by the developments of the Iraqi question, the possible escalation of the situation into a military confrontation, and the serious repercussions this could have on the region and the rest of the world.
- Proceeding from the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and its enshrined principles of Islamic solidarity among the Member States as well as the necessity of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Member States; and pursuant to the resolutions adopted by the various sessions of the Islamic Summit Conference and of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Conference:

1 -Welcomed Iraq's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the cooperation shown by Iraq in facilitating the task of the international inspectors. It invited all states to support Islamic efforts aimed at averting war and expressed the hope that this cooperation will continue to enable the inspectors to complete their tasks as defined by the UN Security Council resolution. It also welcomed the calls made for the need to continue the work of the international inspectors and to give an opportunity for diplomatic and peaceful efforts to resolve this crisis.

2 -Expressed its categorical rejection of any strike against Iraq or threat to the security and safety of any Islamic State and emphasized the need to settle the Iraqi question through peaceful means within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the relevant resolutions of international legitimacy.

3 -Affirmed the need to preserve the security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iraq and of the neighbouring states.

4 -Asserted that the Islamic States abstain from participating in any military action targeting the security and territorial integrity of Iraq or any other Islamic State.

5 -Urged the international community to work towards the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East region, including Israel, in accordance with Paragraph 14 of UN Security Council Resolution No. 687 (1991); and, in this respect, called for an end to the policy of double standards.

6 -Expressed its rejection of any attempt aimed at imposing changes in the region, interfering in its internal affairs, or disregarding its just interests and causes.

7 -Reiterated its solidarity with the Iraqi people and demanded the lifting of the blockade imposed on this people, in accordance with international legitimacy.

8 -Called again on the Republic of Iraq to emphasize the need to respect the independence, sovereignty, and security of the State of Kuwait and ensure its territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders so as to avoid anything that could cause a repeat of what happened in 1990. It also called for the adoption of policies that would guarantee these objectives within the framework of goodwill and good neighbourly relations. In this connection, the Conference underlined the need to end the negative media campaigns and statements to pave the way for the creation of a positive climate to reassure the two countries of commitment to the principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs.

9 -Urged the resumption of the Technical Sub-committee emanating from the Tripartite Committee on the Issue of Kuwaiti Prisoners and Detainees since 1990 and 1991, which had resumed its work on 8th January 2003. It commended the State of Kuwait's positive response to the information provided by Iraq on Kuwait's missing persons through the International Committee of the Red Cross. In this respect, the Conference expressed high hopes that substantial and concrete progress will be made on this issue. It welcomed Iraq's return of part of the Kuwaiti archives and called on

Iraq to return the rest of the archives and other properties of the State of Kuwait.

DECLARATION OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON THE GRAVE CONDITIONS IN PALESTINE.

The Second Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, following with deep concern the grave developments in the occupied Palestinian territories and the tragic living conditions of the Palestinian people and its national leadership, resulting from the barbaric crimes committed by the Israeli occupation forces, which have led to huge losses of lives and properties, to the imposition of a fait accompli, to attacking the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and to the undermining of all regional and international efforts aimed at resuming the peace process;

Affirmed that this heinous aggression constitutes a flagrant violation of the rights of the Palestinian people and a blatant infringement of all conventions and treaties as well as the international humanitarian law, particularly the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949. It constitutes also a deadly blow to peace building efforts in the region with serious implications for international peace and security.

Saluted the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and its legitimate national leadership under President Yasser Arafat for standing up to the occupation, and affirmed its support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people and its determination to continue to mobilize the Islamic capabilities in the service of the Palestinian cause.

Called upon the leaders to extend urgent financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority to meet urgent needs resulting from the continuing and escalating Israeli aggression for the third consecutive year, so as to enable it to provide medical and educational services, to assist hundreds of thousands of unemployed, to support the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and families of martyrs, the injured and detainees, and to enable a minimum of reconstruction and replanting of lands destroyed by Israeli military machinery and the repair of roads and infrastructure.

Emphasized the significance of continued media focus on developments in the occupied Palestinian territories, and of investing continuous information-related efforts to mobilize international solidarity and sympathy for the Palestinian people in their legitimate national struggle against Israeli occupation.

Called upon the United Nations and the Security Council to assume their responsibilities in the preservation of international peace and security by compelling Israel to stop its tyrannical aggression against the Palestinian people, while ensuring necessary international protection for them, as a safeguard against the dangerous violations they are suffering, until they are able to exercise their inalienable national rights in accordance with the resolutions of international legitimacy.

Called for the convening of a meeting of the High Contracting Parties of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 to consider Israeli violations in the occupied Palestinian territories, and to take necessary measures to provide international protection for the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation.

Reaffirmed the strong Islamic position in relation to the question of the City of Al-Quds and its importance for the Islamic world, as expressed in particular, in the outcome of the Nineteenth Session of Al-Quds Committee, chaired by His Majesty King Muhammad VI, and its support for the State of Palestine's position based on commitment to sovereignty over East Jerusalem as the capital of the independent State of Palestine.

Condemned the systematic aggressive policy of the Israeli occupation authorities in confiscating Palestinian lands, in creating and expanding settlements on them, in building barriers and the apartheid wall, in the construction of bypass roads, and in embarking on other settlement activities which are considered a flagrant violation of the United Nations resolutions and international humanitarian law, particularly the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949; regards the settlements as illegal, null and void and of no legal effect and must therefore be dismantled pursuant to the Security Council Resolution No.465;

Condemned the wide-scale systematic, massive, and flagrant violations of human rights perpetrated by the Israeli occupation forces, as measures that are considered war crimes and crimes against humanity, a breach of international humanitarian law, and a serious and blatant infringement on the Palestinian people's right to life;

Emphasized the necessity that the international community, particularly the Quartet, namely, the United States, the European Federation, the Russian Union and the United Nations to act promptly in order to:

- Stop the Israeli aggression on the Palestinian people and halt all assassinations and detention attempts, demolition of homes, destruction of infrastructure and desecration of Islamic and Christian holy places;
- End immediately all aggressive Israeli measures against the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and other Palestinian cities, particularly the policy of judaization and settlements, the demolition of the Palestinians' homes, the appropriation of their lands, and the altering the configuration of their cities; and to end without delay the policy of isolating the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif from its Palestinian environment and of setting up barricades around it to prevent Palestinian access to the city and to their religious sites therein.
- Compel Israel to desist from building the apartheid wall that is eating up the Palestinian territories, that is injurious to the rightful borders of the Palestinian State. and that is exacerbating conditions in the region.
- Ensure the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces, lifting the internal and external blockade and the siege imposed on Palestinian cities, villages and camps, and putting an end to all inhuman Israeli measures and practices against the Palestinian people that are in violation of all international conventions and norms.
- Halt all Israeli settlement measures in the occupied Palestinian territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif.
- Release all Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons.
- Allow the entry of food and medical supplies to the Palestinian territories and set free the funds of the Palestinian Authority, that have been seized by Israel.

- Resume negotiations on the basis of their Terms of Reference, particularly Security Council Resolutions No.242 and No.338, and the land-for-peace formula, from the point where they stopped, in accordance with a specific timetable and a political roadmap based on the relevant Security Council resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiative, which provides for establishing an independent Palestinian State with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, and a just solution to the refugee problem pursuant to the resolutions of international legitimacy, particularly Resolution No. 194.

The leaders reaffirmed their total solidarity with Syria and Lebanon and their rejection of any threats directed against these two brotherly countries. They underlined the necessity of returning the occupied Syrian Golan up to the borders of the 4th of June 1967 borders as well as returning the rest of the occupied Lebanese territories, including the Sheba farms, to Lebanese sovereignty.

Text of President Bush's speech on Iraq

My fellow citizens, events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision. For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy all its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq. Our good faith has not been returned.

The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapon inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged, and systematically deceived. Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again -- because we are not dealing with peaceful men. Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people.

The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other. The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed.

The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security. That duty falls to me,

as Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep.

Recognizing the threat to our country, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly last year to support the use of force against Iraq. America tried to work with the United Nations to address this threat because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. We believe in the mission of the United Nations. One reason the U.N. was founded after the second world war was to confront aggressive dictators, actively and early, before they can attack the innocent and destroy the peace.

In the case of Iraq, the Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 687 -- both still in effect -- the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will.

Last September, I went to the U.N. General Assembly and urged the nations of the world to unite and bring an end to this danger. On November 8th, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations, and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did not fully and immediately disarm. Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power. For the last four-and-a-half months, the United States and our allies have worked within the Security Council to enforce that Council's long-standing demands. Yet, some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq. These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it. Many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace, and a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world. The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.

In recent days, some governments in the Middle East have been doing their part. They have delivered public and private messages urging the dictator to leave Iraq, so that disarmament can proceed peacefully. He has thus far refused. All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in

military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. For their own safety, all foreign nationals -- including journalists and inspectors -- should leave Iraq immediately. Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near. It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power. It is not too late for the Iraqi military to act with honor and protect your country by permitting the peaceful entry of coalition forces to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Our forces will give Iraqi military units clear instructions on actions they can take to avoid being attacked and destroyed. I urge every member of the Iraqi military and intelligence services, if war comes, do not fight for a dying regime that is not worth your own life.

And all Iraqi military and civilian personnel should listen carefully to this warning. In any conflict, your fate will depend on your action. Do not destroy oil wells, a source of wealth that belongs to the Iraqi people. Do not obey any command to use weapons of mass destruction against anyone, including the Iraqi people. War crimes will be prosecuted. War criminals will be punished. And it will be no defense to say, "I was just following orders." Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it. Americans understand the costs of conflict because we have paid them in the past. War has no certainty, except the certainty of sacrifice.

Yet, the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and might of our military, and we are prepared to do so. If Saddam Hussein attempts to cling to power, he will remain a deadly foe until the end. In desperation, he and terrorists groups might try to conduct terrorist operations against the American people and our friends. These attacks are not inevitable. They are, however, possible. And this very fact underscores the reason we cannot live

under the threat of blackmail. The terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed.

Our government is on heightened watch against these dangers. Just as we are preparing to ensure victory in Iraq, we are taking further actions to protect our homeland. In recent days, American authorities have expelled from the country certain individuals with ties to Iraqi intelligence services. Among other measures, I have directed additional security of our airports, and increased Coast Guard patrols of major seaports. The Department of Homeland Security is working closely with the nation's governors to increase armed security at critical facilities across America.

Should enemies strike our country, they would be attempting to shift our attention with panic and weaken our morale with fear. In this, they would fail. No act of theirs can alter the course or shake the resolve of this country. We are a peaceful people -- yet we're not a fragile people, and we will not be intimidated by thugs and killers. If our enemies dare to strike us, they and all who have aided them, will face fearful consequences.

We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year, or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities. The cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities. In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth. Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations -- and responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide. The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now.

As we enforce the just demands of the world, we will also honor the deepest commitments of our country. Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of

human liberty. And when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation. The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come over time. The power and appeal of human liberty is felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace. That is the future we choose. Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the violent. And tonight, as we have done before, America and our allies accept that responsibility.

Good night, and may God continue to bless America.
Tuesday, March 18, 2003